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Abstract
A study was performed to Investigate the construct
validity of the Interpersonal Maturity Level (I-Level)
Classification System, presently used vjidely with juvenile
offenders. The theory was validated for the constructs
of cognitive complexity, Impulse control, and foresight
or ability to plan behavior, but not for the constructs
of locus of control and internalized guilt. Of the
variables studied, cognitive complexity, as measured by
Hunt's Paragraph Completion method, was shown to be the
best single predictor of I-level classification. A
highly sig;nlficant positive relationship was found between
I-level and verbal and non-verbal intelligence (r = ,5S
and r = .53. respectively). However, when the effects
due to intelligence across groups were controlled,
the relationships found significant in the principal tests
of the hypotheses continued to be significant. Results
were discussed in terms of the measures used, the
theoretical implications for I-level as an example of a
theory based on the cognitive-developmental approach to
socialization, and some practical implications for the
use of alternate measures of I-level classification.
Suggested directions for further research were specified.
A CONSTRUCT VALIDITY STUDY OP THE INTfiiiPERSONAL
MATURITY LEVEL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
FOR YOUTri OFFENDERS
A Dissertation
Presented to
the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
by
Darlene R. Miller
Clinical Psychology
August, 1972
A CONSTRUCT VALIDITY STUDY OF THE INTERPERSONAL
MATURITY LEVf-X CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
FOR YOUTH OFFENDERS
A Dissertation Presented
by
Darlene R. Miller
Approved as to style and content by:
7
Nornian Watt, Fh.Di'
Chairman of Committee
Harold Raush, Ph.D.
Member of Committee
H^rry Schumer, Ph.D.
Member o^' Committee
"Steven Klein, i-h.D.
Member of Committee
August. 1972
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This section of a paper Is provided so that apprecia-
tion can be expressed to whomever the writer feels Indebted
for help with his work. It Is the one section not tied to
rather formalized rules of procedure In writing, and In that
sense liberties In "emotional expression" can be taken.
>.'hlle not wanting to appear maudlin and "overly" grateful,
there are In fact a number of people whom I sincerely feel
without their help and support the present work would not
have been completed. I am thankful for this chance to note
publicly my Indebtedness to them and hope that the length of
my acknowledgments will not detract from the appreciation I
feel toward each Individual cited.
To Dr. Norman VJatt, my committee chairman, I express
deepest gratitude and respect for invaluable help and encour-
agement throughout the entire process of work on this project.
Understandably not thrilled Initially by the prospect of
supervising a dissertation student who was living 2,000
miles away from the university, yet his continued patience
and gracious sense of humor saw me through some difficult
moments and provided the impetus to continue. Perhaps most
important, his excitement and enthusiasm for clinical research
somehow rubbed off on a clinical student who was not particu-
larly looking forward to performing an extensive research
project and who in the end felt gratified and perhaps as
equally excited as Dr. Watt himself.
ill
Iv
Appreciation Is also expressed to Nancy Austgen, itobert
Ebensteln, and Doug Hanze for thorough and competent assist-
ance with the process of data collection. Mark Foster,
University of Denver graduate student, deserves a special
note of thanks for decidedly dedicated assistance with the
data analysis. His general expertise and ability to share
his knowledge were Invaluable, and his willingness to put
aside for awhile his own pressing work demands is greatly
appreciated
.
The staffs and youths of the various institutions where
this research was carried out were notably helpful and coop-
erative. So many of these people deserve mention that it is
not possible to Include them all. I wish to especially ex-
press appreciation to Dr. Melvln Anderson, Dr. Martin Molof
,
sind the staff at the Northern Reception Center and Clinic in
Sacramento, California; to George Taylor, Robert Flnnerty,
and the cottage staff at Lookout Kountain School for Boys in
Golden, Colorado; and to Gerald Agee, Director, Edward Mills,
Ward Thayer, and the cottage staff at Mount View School for
Girls in Morrison, Colorado. The youths in these institutions
who served as subjects also deserve special recognition.
They are frequently subjected to participation in research
studies, and it is hoped that their cooperation in the present
study will be at least Indirectly rewarded in the long-run by
the findings of this paper on I-level theory as an approach
for dealing with the youthful offender.
VI am very grateful to Carol Foster, an old "pro" at
dissertations, for cheerfully agreeing to type this manu-
script. V/ithout her skillful assistance and knowledge of
the "ropes." I vjould have experienced great difficulty in
meeting various deadlines.
I also thank the staff of the Colorado Youth Workers
Training Center, especially my immediate employer Daniel
Kertz, for understanding what is involved in preparing a
dissertation and for taking work onto their shoulders which
was rightfully mine. This understanding and support was
especially evident during the periods I had to travel to
Amherst, and without the help of Dan, Nonie, Frank, Herb,
Cal, Mike, Jeanne, and Aloha, I would certainly not have
been able to complete this project in such a relatively
short period of time.
It is appropriate here to acknowledge my respect and
admiration for Dr. Rita VJarren, one of the founders and a
continued expounder and developer of I-level theory. It
was my pleasure to spend five weeks with her and her staff
in Sacramento, an experience which stimulated and increased
my Interest in I-level and the treatment of youthful offenders.
She remains, for me, one of the most impressive psychologists
I have known.
Finally, special appreciation is offered to my good
friend and mentor, Dr. Jeanne Phillips, who as an adviser
through the course of my graduate studies, and in my more
recent work with juvenile offenders, has been unfailing in
vl
encouragement and sound professional counsel, it is with
affection and warmth that I dedicate this paper to her.
TA3LE OP CONTa^TS
Page
ACKNO'ILSDGMETIT.S
LIST OF TABLES
Chapter
I INTRODUCTION
II REVIE 'I OP LITEiLA.TU?J5
Cognitive-Developmental Ap-oroach to
Socialization ^ ii
Interpersonal Fiaturity Level (I-Level)
Classification System 13
Construct Validity 21
Intelligence 25
III RATIONALE 33
IV MSTEOD 39
Subjects 39
Measures i+O
Procedure ..... ^5
Treatment of Data ^7
V _1ESI]LTS -^9
Tests of Principal Hypotheses ^9
Multitrait-Kultimethod Katrix Analysis
of Duplicate I'easures 57
Factor Analysis of Dependent Measures . . 70
Discriminant Function Analysis of
Dependent Ileasures 7^
Comparative Analysis of Alternate
Measures to I-Level Classification .... 83
vii
viii
Chapter P^^^
Test of the Devil's Advocate Hypothesis
. 8?
VI DISCUSSION
Some Implications for I-Level Theory
as an Example of the Cognitive-DeveloD-
mental Approach to Socialization ..... 98
Intelligence, Gog-nitive Complexity,
and I-Level I03
Some Implications for the Utilization
of Alternate t'easures of I-Level
Classification 110
Directions for Further Research II6
VII SUMMARY 118
REFEREITCES 12^
APPHMDICHS
A Integration-Level Interviex<7 Schedule .... I3I
B Rating Scales of Youths' Internal-
External ?ocus 137
C Rating Scales of Youths' Cognitive
Complexity 139
D Rating Scales of Youths' Internalized
Guilt 1^1
E Rating Scale of Attitude of K'orker
Tox^ard Youth 1^3
P Initial Instructions to Subject Groups . . . 1^5
G Rotter Locus of Control (I-E) Scale 1^7
H Kosher Guilt Scale 152
I Hunt Paragraph Completion Measure 156
J Feather Choice- of-Prizes Test l64
K Instructions for the Porteus Mazes Test . . . I66
APPEMDICES (continued) Page
L Sunmary of Original and Partial
Correlation Coefficients of I-Level
with Dependent Variables x\rith Age,
Sex, and ICthnic Background P.emoved 169
K Jane Loevinger on Factor iVnalysis and
Personality ^.esearch lyi
N Description of the Seven Levels of
I-Level Theory I73
0 Table of Raw Scores I80
LIST 0? TABLES
^^^^^ PAGE
1 I-Level Schema (Levels 2, 3, and 4) 18
2 Keans and Analyses of l^ariance of Locus of
Control for Three I-Level Groups 5I
3 Keans and Analyses of Variance of Cognitive
Complexity for Three I-Level Groups 52
4 Keans and Analyses of Variance of Internalized
Guilt for Three I-Level Groups 53
5 Means and Analysis of Variance of Impulse
Control (Porteus Q Score) for Three I-Level
Groups 5^
6 Means and Analysis of Variance of Delay of
Gratification (Feather Choice-of-Prizes
Test) for Three I-Level Groups 56
7 Means and Analysis of Variance of Foresight
(Porteus TQ Score) for Three I-Level Groups
. . 58
8 Means and Analyses of Variance of VJISC
Intelligence for Three I-Level Groups 59
9 Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix Analysis of
Duplicate Measures 61
10 Correlation Matrix of Liking Variable with
Instrument and .iated Variables and Partial
Correlation Matrix with Liking Partialed Out
. .
65
11 Summary of Correlation Analyses of Hater
Variables with Cognitive Complexity Partialed
Out Alone and Cognitive Complexity and
Verbal I.Q. Partialed Out Together 69
12 Factor Analysis: Rotated Factor Matrix of
Eleven Dependent Variables 73
13 Discriminant Function Analysis of Dependent
Measures 77
Ik Summary of Analyses of Multiple Regression
of Eleven Dependent Variables on I-level
Classification for Three Sets of Groups .... 81
X
Table
xl
Page
15 Table of Intercorrelatlons of I-Level,
CoR-nitlve Complexity, JISC Verbal I.q!,
and the Dependent Variables
16 Summary of Analyses of Variance of
Dependent Variables as a unction of
I-Level, Coj?\nitive Complexity, and
Wise Verbal I.Q '
17 Summary of Partial Correlations of
Dependent Variables with I-Level:
Partialing Out Verbal I.Q. Alone,
Verbal and Won-Verbal 1.0. Top;ether,
and Verbal I.Q., Non-Verbal I.Q., and
Cognitive Complexity Together 89
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
A method of classification currently In use In clini-
cal practice, particularly viith populations of juvenile
offenders, Is the Interpersonal Maturity Level (I-level)
Classification System. As originally formulated by Sullivan,
Grant, and Grant (1957), I-level is presented both as a
theory of personality development with specific application
to delinquent behavior and as a clinical tool. The system
is not then solely a model for diagnosing youthful offenders
and placing them into various I-level categories, but it is
also a method for identifying and selecting youths for
clearly prescribed differential modes of treatment, based
upon the presumably different needs of children at different
levels in the system. Providing a composite of diagnostic
categories and procedures, treatment modalities and prescrip-
tions, this conceptualization purports to offer an evolving,
practical intervention program for delinquency control and
individual growth.
I-level has continued to gain in popularity over the
past fifteen years and more recently has been Implemented
for use in correctional systems in various state divisions
of youth services. At the present time, it appears that
this approach "stands as a leading candidate to become the
dominant one in differential treatment (Gibbons, 1970, p. 23)."
Despite Its acclaim and its application in the treatment of
literally thousands of juvenile offenders, however, the I-
level typolosy has not yet been subjected to the kind of
ongoing critical analysis which is necessary and expected
of a new psychosocial theoretical formulation. The theoreti-
cal conceptualization on which the I-level typology is based
is not explicitly grounded in previously existing theories
of personality development, although elements of the work
of Piaget. Erikson. G. H. Mead, and H. S. Sullivan are
evident. Thus, as is frequently the situation with new
theoretical approaches to personality theory, there is no
way to systematically assess its validity in terms of existing
evidence related to these or other formulations. In this
instance, alternative indicators of construct validity must
be Investigated (Becker and Heyman. 1971).
Research pertaining to the I-level approach to classifi-
cation, however, has been almost exclusively directed toward
assessing the predictive validity of I-level theory, i.e.,
for predicting the utility of I-level classification as a
means of assignment to different modes of treatment. The
emphasis, then, has been on outcome studies predicting such
factors as lox^er recidivism rates, psychological test-score
changes, etc., as a result of I-level classification and con-
comitant differential treatment strategies. Questions related
to the construct validity of I-level theory have essentially
been ignored,
r4ore specifically, the I-level classification system is
based upon an intensive clinical interview which focuses
primarily upon interpersonal relationships, and presumes
theoretically to encompass certain specific behavioral
dispositions. For example, it is presmed that there are
significant predictable differences betv/een youths at variou
levels in terms of their power orientations, cognitive com-
plexity, internalization of standards, impulse control,
and foreslghtf ulness, yet very few studies are available
which empirically test those theoretical premises. The
purpose of the present study, then. Is to Investigate
certain premises and behavioral correlates germane to this
classification system, many of which lend themselves readily
to measurement, in an attempt to assess the construct
validity of I-level theory.
Chapter II
REVIEW OF LITEPiATUHS
The Cop:nltlve-Develor)inental Approach to Socialization
Theories of psychological development have traditionally
placed a heavy emphasis on the process of socialization in
the ongoing growth of individuals. While these theories
are many and varied, it is possible to characterize them
as representing one of three basic approaches to development:
maturational, environmental, or cognitive-developmental.
Maturatlonal theories of development, such as those
of Gesell (195^) and Lorenz (I965), stress an innate pattern-
ing which exists in the organism from birth, and in dealing
with developmental changes have emphasized the idea of un-
folding maturational stages which guide the development of
the child. Environmental or learning theories of develop-
ment often allow for genetic factors in personality (Hull,
19^3) "but stress the importance of patterns of events in the
environment (stimulus contingencies), and assume that the
basic structures of complex responses are reflections of
structures existing outside the child, given by the social
and physical world (Skinner, 1953). Given these two rather
extreme positions, cognitive-developmental theories are
"interactional" in that they assume that basic mental
structure is the product of the patterning of the interaction
between the organism and the environment, rather than
5directly reflecting either innate patterns in the organism
or patterns of events in the environment.
Each of these three approaches makes different sets of
assumptions and involves varying constructs. As stated
previously, the present study will be concerned with the
constructs central to a specific developmental theory, the
Interpersonal Maturity Level Classification system of
Sullivan, Grant, and Grant. Since this theory is a theory
of socialization in the context of the cognitive-develop-
mental approach, a more detailed explanation of the assumptions
Underlying this approach to development will be first
presented as background and a context for later description
of the Interpersonal Maturity system. This description of
the cognitive-developmental approach will draw heavily upon
Kohlberg (1969b), who has summarized in an effective,
coherent way an extensive body of related literature that
is not always easy to understand.
The term "cognitive-developmental" refers to a set of
assumptions and approaches to research which are common to
several theories of social and cognitive development.
Representative of these various theories are the formulations
of Baldwin (I906), Dewey (1930), Mead (193^). Plaget (19^8),
Sullivan, Grant, and Grant (1957), Loevinger (I966), and
Kohlberg (1969a)
.
According to Kohlberg (1969b), cognitive-developmental
theories share the following basic assumptions:
1) Basic development involves basic transformations
of cognitive structure . It is not possible to define or
6explain these transformations by the parameters of associa-
tionistic learning (contiguity, repetition, reinforcement,
etc.), but rather they must be explained by parameters of
organizational wholes or systems of internal relations.
2) Development of cognitive structure is the result
of processes of interaction between the structure of the
organism and the structure of the environment. This develop-
ment, then, is not directly maturational nor is it the
direct result of learning (in the sense of a direct shaping
of the organism's response to agree with environmental
structures)
.
3) Cognitive structures are always defined as structures
of action ; that is, the organization of various modes of
responding is always an organization of actions upon objects.
4) The direction of development of cognitive structure
is toward greater equilibrium in the interaction of the
organism and the environment; in other words, of movement
toward a greater balance or reciprocity between the action
of the organism upon the perceived object or situation and
the action of the perceived object upon the organism. Kohlberg
notes that this balance is reflected in the underlying
stability (conservation) of a cognitive act v^hich is under-
going apparent transformation, with corresponding development
then being representative of a broadened system of trans-
formations maintaining such conservation or stability.
These first four assumptions are assumptions which hold
for the development of ways of thinking about both physical
7and social objects, i.e. for cognitive development in general.
However, in order to make more concrete their application
to social development, some additional related assmptions
pertaining to social-emotional development are necessary.
B'our further assumptions, then, are:
5) Affective development and functioning on the one
hand, and cognitive development and functioning on the other,
are not distinct and separate entities. Rather, "affective"
and "cognitive" development are parallel
,
merely representing
different contexts and perspectives in defining structural
change
,
6) Following up on the first assumption regarding the
explanation of basic development in terms of parameters of
organizational v^holes or systems of internal relations,
cognitive-developmental theorists (see especially Loevinger,
1966) emphasize the existence of a fundamental unity of
personality organization and development knoxm as the ego,
or the self. V/hile there are various aspects of social
development (moral development, psychosexual development,
intellectual development, etc.), these aspects are united by
their common reference to a single concept of self in a
single social world (Sullivan, Grant, and Grant, 1957).
Cognitive-developmental theorists further state that social
development is, in essence, the restructuring of the
a) concept of self, b) in its relationship to concepts of
other people, c) conceived as being in a common social xwrld
with social standards (Kohlberg. 1969b). Also, in addition
8to the unity of level of social development due to general
cognitive development (what is known as the g factor in
mental maturity kinds of tests), there is said to be a
further unity of development due to a common factor of
ego maturity (Loevinger, I966)
.
7) Social cognition always involves role-taking ; in
other vjords, an ax>jareness that the other person is in some
way similar to the self, and that the other knox-^s or is
responsive to the self in a system where expectations are
complementary. In this sense developmental changes in the
social self reflect parallel changes in conceptions of the
social world,
8) The direction of social or ego development is also
movement toward an equilibrium or reciprocity (as in assump-
tion number four) betvjeen the self's actions and those of
others toward the self (e.g., as In principles of justice
which are conceived in terms of reciprocity or equality, or
relationships of "love," i.e., reciprocal Intimacy).
Some definitions and elaborations are necessary at this
point. As noted, cognitive-developmental theories presuppose
distinctions between behavior changes or learning in general
and changes in mental structure . Structure, in this sense,
refers to the general characteristics of shape, pattern, or
organization of response rather than to the rate or intensity
of response or its pairing with particular stimuli. Cognitive
structure refers to rules for processing information or for
connecting (Integrating in Sullivan, Grant, and Grant's
system) experienced events. Cognition (as most clearly
evident in thinking) means putting things together or
relating events, and this connecting or Integrating is an
active connecting process, not a passive connecting of events
through external association and repetition. This means,
to a large extent, that the process of relating particular
events depends upon prior general modes of relating
developed by the organism. Cognitive theorists term the
most general m-odes of relating objects "categories of
experience" which include the relations of causality, sub-
stantiality, space, time, quantity and logic (Kohlberg,
1969b)
.
To back up a little, one of the basic cognitive-
developmental assumptions (number two. above) is that mental
structure Is the result of an interaction between certain
organlsmic structuring tendencies and the structure of the
outside world. This interaction of organism and environment
leads to the concept of cognitive stages
. In other words,
this interaction leads to cognitive stages which represent
the transformations of simple early cognitive structures
as these are applied to (or assimilate) the external world,
and as they are accomodated to or restructured by the
external world in the course of being applied to it. And
actually the core of the cognitive-developmental position
is this tenet of cognitive stages.
Plaget (i960) has outlined the following general
characteristics of cognitive stages (adapted from Kohlberg,
1969b)
:
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1. stages Imply distinct or qualitative differences
in persons' modes of thinking or of solving the same
problems at different ages.
2. These different modes of thought form an invariant
seouence, order or succession in individual development.
It is said, for example, that cultural and environmental
factors or innate capabilities may make one child or
group of children reach a given level of development
at a much earlier point of time than another child
.
All children, however, should still go through the same
order of steps or levels, regardless of environmental
teaching or lack of teaching. In other words, while
cultural factors may speed up, slow dom, or stop develop-
ment, they do not change its sequence. Piaget states
that there is an irjner logic that determines this
sequence, and continues by claiming that in determining
a person's current behavior, this inner logic of
development is as important as his history or his
heredity or his environment. Jane Loevinger agrees
with Piaget and adds that the inner logic of develop-
ment becomes a compelling conviction to those working
in the area: "Because there is an inner logic—one
not yet full verbalized— experienced, intuitive
clinicians usually grasp the schema quickly (Loevinger,
1966, p. 201)."
3. Each of these different and sequential modes
of thought forms a "structu^ied whole." A given stage-
response on a task is not just representative of a
specific response determined by knowledge and familiarity
with that task or even with tasks similar to it. Instead
it represents an underlying thought-organization, e.g.,
"the level of concrete operations," which determines
responses to tasks vMch are not obviously similar.
According to riaget, at the stage of concrete operations,
the child has a general tendency to believe that a
physical object conserves its properties on various
physical dimensions in spite of apparent perceptual
changes. Piaget and other cognitive-developmental
theorists insist that this tendency is structural; it
is not a specific belief about a specific object.
^. Cognitive stages are hierarchial integrations,
i.e., stages form an order of increasingly differ-
entiated and integrated structures to fulfill a
common function, maintenajice of an equilibrium between
the organism and the environment. Higher stages re-
integrate the structures found at lower stages. For
example, formal operational thought in the Piagetian
sense includes all the structural features of concrete
operational thought but at a new level of organization.
Concrete operational thought does not disappear when
12
formal thoup-ht develops, but rather continues to be used
in concrete situations x^here it is adequate or when
attempts at solution by fomal thoup;ht have not worked.
However, as Kohlberg points out, there is a hierarchical
preference within each individual; in other vjords, a
disposition to prefer to solve a problem at the highest
level available to her or him.
One further point before moving on to the next section
xvhlch may be helpful in clarifying: the nature of the coc:niti\
developmental approach, is that this approach is not a
theory about the process by which all behavior chanr:e
occurs, as, for instance, "learning theories" are. Rather,
it is a prc^ram. of sjialysis. As Kohlberg notes, "some
behavior changes are 'structural' and 'directed' as
evidenced by proceeding through sequential stages, while
other behavior changes are not (Kohlberg, I969 b, p. 360)."
In other words, behavior changes x^^hich appear to be
progressive and Irreversible require a different kind of
analysis than do behavior changes which are reversible
and sitiiationally specif Ic In nature. It Is to these
kinds of irreversible changes that I-level theory
addresses itself.
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The Interpersonal Maturity Level (I-level)
Classification System
An example of a cognitive-developmental approach to
socialization is the Interpersonal Maturity Level (I-level)
Classification System originally presented by Sullivan,
Grant, and Grant in 1957. The first application of the
theory began in the 1950 's with a study of military offenders
(Grant and Grant, 1959). A major elaboration of I-level
theory occurred in I96O-I96I with the beginnings of the
Community Treatment Project (OTP) (Grant, I96I) , and the
theory has since been revised and expanded during the years
of experimentation in the CTP (warren, I966). The CTP is
a program for treatment of juvenile offenders in the
California Youth Authority. V/hile I-level as an approach to
treating juvenile offenders has been primarily utilized in
the California Youth Authority, the system is currently
being implemented by the Division of Youth Services in the
State of Colorado, while at the same time Nevada, Utah,
Illinois, New York, Vv'isconsin, and Oregon are making some
limited use of the approach,
I-level theory, in its original formulation, described
a sequence of personality (or character) integrations in
normal personality development. The system focuses upon
the ways in which the individual is able to see himself and
the world, and the ways he is able to interpret what is
happening between himself and others, as well as among
others. According to the theory, seven successive stages
of interpersonal maturity characterize psychological
development, ranging from the least mature (which resembles
the Interpersonal reactions of a newborn infant), to an
Ideal of social m.aturity which it is said is seldom or
never reached in our present culture (Warren, 1970). Each
of the seven stages, or levels, is defined by a crucial
interpersonal problem which must be solved before further
progress toward maturity can occur. All persons do not
necessarily work their way through each stage, but may
possibly become fixated at a particular level (Warren, I969)
.
It is stressed that interpersonal development is viewed as
a continuum. It should be noted here that stages of
development are the primary emphasis of this theory and
that, in line with the cognitive-developmental approach,
they are purported to be invariant in sequence and hier-
archical in terms of integration.
In order to explain I-level theory in a more compre-
hensive way, the concept of the "core structure of personality"
will first be described, followed by a description of the
primary levels of integration or interpersonal maturity
that make up the I-level system of development.
In describing the cognitive-developmental approach, it
was noted that cognitive theorists label the most general
modes of relating as "categories of experience." In the
same way, a premise basic to I-level theory is that the
human organism tends to break experience into its con-
stituent elements to provide reference points in adjusting
to the complex stimulus structure of the external world
(Sullivan, Grant, and Grant, 1957). In line with the
interactional approach to cognitive development, it is said
that these reference points are not isolated from one
another, but rather are merged in a basic, central reference
scheme or cognitive world, in which the experienced world of
the person is integrated with, and modified by, personal
needs and expectations. Furthermore, the nature and quality
of perception and experience influence the development of
expectations and hypotheses about reference points and
thereby determine the behavioral consequences of experience.
Sullivan, Grant, and Grant continue:
Over a period of time a relatively consistent
set of expectations and attitudes is established
as a kind of interpreting and working philosophy
of life. It is this nexus of gradually expanding
experience, expectations, hypotheses, and percep-
tions which makes up the core of personality.
Commimication and social interaction are crucial
determinants in the development of this core,
helping to expand and elaborate the basic poten-
tial with which a person is born (Sullivan, Grant,
and Grant, I957, p. 373).
In the same way that Kohlberg identified a basic under-
lying stability to cognitive acts which were moving toward
greater equilibrium in the interaction of the organism and
the environment, so I-level theory posits a similar stability
as complex patterns of organization are developed.
According to the theory, in the normal course of events
the individual not only becomes more differentiated as
newer and more complex patterns of organization are
developed , but since new stimuli tend to be assimilated
in such a xvay as to require the least amount of cognitive
reorganization, the person also tends to become relatively
more simplified and Integrated. For Sullivan. Grant, and
Grant, then, it follows that the content of the core of
personality cannot be considered to be stable; however,
the core can reasonably be viewed as an integration, as a
"set of principles about which a variety of content can be
organized." In this sense, the theorists are hypothesizing
a basic consistency and stability in regard to the principles
of organization.
A good synthesis of the way In which 1-level theory
views the developmental process is found in the following
quote:
The normal pattern of emotional-social
development follows a trend tov7ard increasing
involvement with people, objects, and social'
institutions. These involvements give rise to
new needs, demands, and situations. Inherent
in many of these new situations are problems of
perceptual discrimination with regard to the
relationships existing betv7een the self and the
external environment. As these discriminations
are made and assimilated, a cognitive restructuring
of experience and expectancy takes place. A new
reference scheme is then developed; a new level
of integration is achieved. However, the
potentiality for change and the direction.
Intensity, and. character of reorganization
are determined in part by the characteristics
of the prevailing organization. The foundation
for subsequent integrations is laid in preceding
levels; the synthesis and integration of one set
of stimuli and problems are essential to the
perception of the next. Each new level of in-
tegration may be regarded as the psychological
analogue of an increasingly efficient optical
lens. The more advanced the sequel of integra-
tions, the less the likelihood of perceptual
distortion. The person can see himself and the
world more accurately and can operate more
effectively (Sullivan, Grant, and Grant, 1957,
p. 375).
As noted previously, I-level diagnosis has been utilized
almost exclusively with an adolescent delinquent population.
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Within this population, the range of levels found is from
Maturity Level 2 (Integration Level 2. or 1-2) to Maturity
Level 5 (1-5). Level 5. however, is infrequently repre-
sented, in the adolescent delinquent population (approximately
2 per cent in the California Youth Authority). Since
Levels 2. 3, and k represent the bulk of juvenile offenders,
the present discussion mil limit itself to descriptions of
some of the constructs germane to these levels of inter-
personal maturity development. Table 1 is presented as
a schematic representation of some of the basic premises
or constructs which pertain to Levels 2, 3, and 4.
The major instrument utilized in arriving at an I-level
diagnosis is a semi-structured interview of one to one-and-
a-half hours in length. The two basic goals of the inter-
view are to obtain, in as pure a form as possible 1) the
interviewee's perception of the world—his view of himself,
of others, and of relationships among these perceptions
(i.e., his Interpersonal Maturity Level ) and 2) the inter-
viewee's way of responding to his perceptions of the world—
his typical patterns of adjustment (i.e., subtype within
Interpersonal Maturity Level.
. It should be noted here
that nine such subtypes have been identifed within the
delinquent population; however, the present study is con-
cerned only with the diagnosis and validity of levels within
this system.)
The interview is set up to loosely follow a pre-
determined guideline of content areas to be covered in the
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Table 1
I-LEVEL SCHEMA (LEVELS 2, 3, and
CONSTRUCT: COGNITIVE STYLE ( COKPLS/'ITY)
LEVEL 2
LEVEL 3
LEVEL ^;
Stereotypy; conceptual confusion; very
concrete thinking; anarchic in social
responses; little ability to differentiate
among people; when asked to describe
parents may say, "Parents are my mother
and father" or "Parents are Mr. and Krs,
Johnson.
"
Conceptual simplicity; stereotypes;
cliches; has not yet distinguished self
from learned, impersonal "rule-book"
standards; differentiates among people
in superficial way; vrhen asked to describe
parents may say, "Parents are nice. Mine
let me stay out late"; describes people
in terms of physical appearance and what
they do
.
Conceptual complexity with the idea
of patterning; capable of abstract
reasoning; ability to differentiate
among people in terms of personal,
inner meanings for their behavior;
describes people in terms of inner
dynamics and who they are (as opposed
to what they do) ; may say "Parents
have a rough time of it. They try
to do the right things but often their
kids don't understand,"
CONSTRUCT: INTERNALIZATION OF STANDARDS (VALUES)
LEVEL 2: An action is bad because it is punished;
fears retaliation vjhen commits an act;
sees laws or rules as the denying acts
of specific individuals rather than as
expressions of more generalized ethical
and controlling systems; may react to
felt denial by taking things which do
not belong to him; when asked, how he
feels when he steals things may say,
"I feel good. I needed it."
LEVEL 3: Rules are obeyed just because they are
rules; shame and guilt are situational
resulting from, breaking rules; no
internalized guilt is involved, although
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Table 1 (Continued)
LEVEL 4:
superficial protestation of guilt arefrequent; absence of rules means no
rules; when asked how he feels about
stealing may say, "Bad. I almost
always get caught."
Self- evaluated standards exist; morality
has been internalized; sanction for
transgression is internalized guilt;
when fails to live up to internalized
standards feels guilty and critical
of self; when asked about stealing may
say, "It's wrong to rip-off people.
I know better and I don't know why I
did it—maybe for attention."
CONSTRUCT: ORIENTATION TO POWER AND CONTROL
LEVEL 2
LEVEL 3;
Primarily involved vjith demands that
the world take care of him; sees others
solely as "givers" or "deniers" in
terms of sources of supply; has no
sense that he can be a "generator" of
behavior in others, therefore has no
feeling of control over what happens to
him; completely at the mercy of others.
Seeks external structure in t
rules and formulae for operat
celves the world and his part
a power dimension; constantly
with who has the power at the
feels has some limited power
what happens to him; typical
are either to conform to the
confront it.
erms of
ion; per-
In it on
concerned
moment
;
to affect
responses
power or
LEVEL ^: Sees life as
does not see
but feels he
own destiny;
of standards
and others' behavior.
presenting many choices;
self as a pawn of fate,
holds the origin of his
has Internalized a set
by which he judges his
CONSTRUCT: IMPULSE CONTROL AND DELAY OF GRATIFICATION
LEVEL 2: Control of impulses is lacking or at
best und ependable ; senses he must
communicate his desires to others but
is baffled when his demands are not
Immediately gratified; v;hen asked to
Table 1 (Continued)
wait a few minutes will resDond with
"I want it nowl"; may become aggressive
when not immediately gratified.
LEVEL 3: Control of impulses better established
than at Level 2, although when faced
with peer pressure will go along with
the crowd; more successful in con-
trolling impulses when with adults; will
often get drunk or take drugs and lose
control; can postpone gratification if
not required to do so for a very long
time.
LEVEL ^: Long-term goals and ideals; is able to
delay gratification for long periods
of time; may say "I'm going to get a
college education and then buy that
sports car I want"
; impulse control is
dependable and not as susceptible to
peer influence as at Level 3.
CONSTRUCT: TII-iS PERSPECTIVE (FORESIGHT)
LEVEL 2: "Time-bound," i.e., very much tied to
present with little, if any, ability
to think in terms of past and future
events; concerned only with " here- and
-
now"; may not remember when asked, "Do
you know what we did yesterday?"
LEVEL 3: Less bound to present events than Level
2, however, is not motivated to achieve
in a long-range sense, or to plan for
the future; demonstrates some limited
foresight but in a vague, superficial
way, e.g., "Some day I'll probably
get married and settle down."
LEVEL 4: Possesses an ability to evaluate
past, present, and future influences;
motivated to plan the future course of
his life; understands that people change
over time, e.g., "My mother is different
than she used to be before she married
my step-father."
Table 1 - Adapted from Sullivan, Grant, and Grant (1957)
Loevlnger and Wessler (1970).
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interview session. The interviewer begins with the broadest
possible question in each content area, and then follows the
lead of the interviewee into more specific questions.
Questions are asked in an open-ended manner to avoid pro-
viding the interviewee with a ready-made frame of reference.
A copy of the suggested I-level interview schedule is pre-
sented in Appendix A.
Since the present study involves the question of con-
struct validity in relation to I-level theory and the
concepts central to Levels 2, 3, and k described above, a
brief summary of this specific type of validational procedure
seems appropriate.
Construct Validity
The concept of construct validity, as set forth in the
APA Technical Recommendations for Psychological Tests in
195^, was proposed for the situation in which "... the
tester had no definitive criterion measure of the quality
with which he Is concerned and must use Indirect measures
to validate the theory (APA, 195^. P. 214)." In other words,
this type of validation was developed to assist researchers
In circumstances such as the present one, with I-level
theory, where an attempt is being made to operationalize
a new conceptual system in terms of appropriate criteria
or measures. The task of the Investigator is to select a
measure which is logically and consistently related to the
theory so that the results can be interpreted and can lead
to future hypotheses within the same theoretical context.
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According to Cronbach and l^ieehl (1955). the ultimate goal of
such a valldatlonal procedure is to imbed the new construct
in a nomological net. an Interlocking system of laws which
constitutes a theory. They note that:
'^e do not first 'prove* the theory, and then
validate the test, nor conversely. In any probable
Inductive type of inference from a pattern of
observations, we examine the relation between
the total network of theory and observations.
The system involves propositions relating: test
to construct, construct to other constructs, and
finally relating some of these constructs to
observables
. . . Traditionally the proposition
claiming to interpret the test has been set aoart
as the hypothesis being tested, but actually the
evidence is significant for all parts of the
chain. If the prediction is not confirmed, any
link in the chain may be wrong (Cronbach and
Keehl, 1955, P. 29^).
If the theory is unclearly stated, or so presented
that no hypotheses are generated, and/or the measure does
not clearly relate to the theory, then meaningful research
on it cannot be conducted and the essential network of
relationships and distinctions cannot be established.
In this approach, a fundamental distinction is made
between behavior relevance and behavior equivalence
. In
other words, If It is impossible to find a criterion
measure which is equivalent to the trait or theory being
tested, then the investigator can search for other observable
behaviors which, while not equivalent to the trait, are
nonetheless related to It. For exam.ple, if an investigator
has a test of the trait "depression," he might be unable
to find a criterion which is equivalent to this construct;
however, he can make a number of predictions about relevant
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behaviors which are bnr.od on his thoorotloal undorstandlnp;
of what Is Implied by the terra "depression. " :juch predictions
mlffht Include statements to the effect that those scorlnp; hl^h
on his test would show a p;rcator Incidence of suicides,
sleep disorders, crylnp; behavior, psychiatric hospitaliza-
tions, pessimism, etc. While none of these observable
behaviors Is In and of Itself equivalent to depression,
the verification of a number of hypotheses such as these
would lead to Increaslnp; confidence In the Investigator's
theory and Instrument.
In what became a "classic" exchanp;o In the psycholop.l-
cal literature, Harold Hechtoldt (1959) took stronp; Issue
with the Idea of valldatlnp: tests by means of construct
validation. In response to Cronbach and Keohl's (1955)
article, ho hold that construct validity Is little more
then the renamlnp; of the basic process of theory bulldlnK,
and that It contained the danp;er not only of Introduclnp:
undesirable oonfuslcn, but more seriously of leading re-
searchers In psycholopy away from a strict adherence to
operational definition which is essential to scientific
progress In psychology. Following an eloquent attack,
Bechtoldt recommended that "the formulation of construct
validity, as presented In the several papers noted In
this critique, be eliminated from further consideration
as a way of speaking about psychological concepts, laws,
and theories (Bechtoldt, 1959. P. 62?)."
The debate continued and in i960 Donald Campbell pub-
lished a further analysis of construct validation and a
critique of Sechtoldt's position in which he denied that
construct validation represents the abandonment of opera-
tionalism or encourages the reification of traits, as
Bechtoldt had argued. Campbell also suggested the need to
distinguish two types of construct validity— trait validity
and nomolo,sical validity. The first of these "is applicable
at that level of development still typical of most test
development efforts, in which 'theory,' if any, goes no
farther than indicating a hypothetical syndrome, trait, or
personality dimension. The second type
. . . would represent
the very important and novel emphasis of Cronbach and heehl
on the possibility of validating tests by using the scores
from a test as interpretations of a certain term in a
formal theoretical network and
,
through this, to generate
predictions which would be validating if confirmed when
interpreted as still other operations and scores (Campbell,
i960, p. 5^7)."
The present writer is sympathetic to Campbell's more
moderate position and believes that perhaps too much has
been made of this controversy. The connotation has been
created that construct validity was offered as a new type
of validation procedure, when in actuality, as Campbell
points out, it is as old as the concept of test validity
itself, and "is needed in any inventory of the useful
procedures by which tests and theories have been shown
to be invalid in the past (Campbell, I960, p. 5^8)."
In an extensive critique of the I-level classification
system. Becker and Heyman (1971) conclude that due to
theoretical problems, methodological inadequacies, and
difficulties with reporting, neither the appropriateness
of the typology nor the efficacy of treatment based on it
have been demonstrated. They point out that "in the absence
of competing formulations, extensive human and economic
resources are being invested in the diffusion of the
(I-level) system into correctional programs in many areas.
The highest priority should be given, therefore, to
systematic efforts to study and enhance the reliability
and construct validity of the typology
. . . (Becker and
Heyman. 1971, p. ^9)." The concept of construct validation
as presented by Cronbach and Meehl and Campbell seems
appropriate for such studies as are called for by Becker
and Heyman. since for 1-level theory no a priori defining
criterion Is available as a perfect measure or defining
operation against which to check the theory. Rather, some
Independent way(s) of getting at "the same" traits as
postulated by the theory must be sought.
Intelligence
The relationship of intelligence to personality
development has been an issue of Importance in numerous
psychological studies. Indeed, in a number of research
efforts noted by Anderson (i960). It was found that
intelligence carried a heavy predictive load in most
measures of outcome and emerged as a more significant
factor than the personality measures used. In light of
findings such as these It becomes Important to briefly
review the Intelligence literature, and to assess the
relationship of intelligence to I-level theory.
The term "intelligence" is one that has long carried
many different meanings. Frequently, however, in response
to the question "What is intelligence?" the common answer
has been "Intelligence is what intelligence tests measure."
In an effort to provide a conceptual framework of more
complexity and specificity in order to begin to answer this
query in a more differentiated way, several divergent
points of view and theoretical and empirical generaliza-
tions have evolved.
For example, factor analysts studying Intelligence
have been roughly divided into two camps—those who use
factorial methods that allow a general intellectual
factor (g) to emerge as the first factor of Intelligence,
and those who prefer methods which yield a number of
Independent or primary factors and no large general factor.
Guilford (1967) is perhaps the best representative of
multiple-factor analysis in the Thurstone tradition. He
argues that current definitions of intelligence are too
narrow and vague, and that preference for a general
intellectual factor over multiple factors is due to a
restricted view of the area of intelligence, a view that
will hinder progress. As an alternative to theories
emphasizing g, Guilford has presented a model called the
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"Structure of the Intellect,., a model that is represented
spatially as a three-dimensional cube. The three dimensions
are broken into four, five and six categories, and therefore,
yield 120 cells, each of which represents a factor.
In contrast, Vernon (I965) is representative of factor
analysts who prefer techniques that yield a large g factor
and who build "heirarchical" models. Vernon's model is
represented as an inverted tree. At the top is g. the
general intellective factor. This factor is followed at
a lower level by two major group factors, verbal- educational
and spatial-practical-mechanical. Each of these is followed
by additional, minor factors such as the creative abilities,
verbal fluency, and number factors under verbal-educational,
and spatial, psychomotor, and mechanical information factors
under spatial-practical-mechanical. Factors high on the
tree, then, refer to a wide variety of behaviors, and
factors low on the tree to narrower ranges of behavior.
And, In fact, Vernon believes that many of Guilford's and
Thurstone's factors are of such a low degree of generaliz-
ability that they are of no practical utility.
A theory of intelligence which falls somewhere between
g and multiple factor analysis is Cattell's theory of fluid
and crystallized intelligence (Cattell. I963; Horn and
Cattell. 1966). Cattell has argued that the general
intelligence factor (g) is in fact at least two interrelated
and cooperative factors. The first is fluid intelligence [Gf),
a "general relation-perceiving capacity which operates in
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all fields" and is biologically determined; the second is
crystallized intelligence (Gc) , a "sum of particular
relation-perceiving skills acquired in specific fields"
and therefore environmentally determined (Gattell, 1957,
p. 877). Apparently Gf is conceived as some quality of
the nervous system upon which the individual, in his
encounters with the environment, builds what Gattell calls
"general solution instruments" or "aids." The sum of
these "aids" is the factor Gq,
Numerous other approaches to conceptualizing intelligence
could be summarized, among these Guttman's (I965) facet
theory, Piaget's (1950, 1952) cog-nitive model, and various
Information-processing theories, to name a few. However,
the theorizing of Hayes (I962) seems more germane to the
present discussion of I-level theory, since some similarities
between the two theories are apparent.
Hayes (I962) argues that intelligence is nothing more
than a collection of learned abilities and that individual
differences in intelligence are due solely to experience
producing drives (EPDs), which are inherited tendencies
to engage in activities conducive to learning. He postulate^s
that intelligence depends not on the average strength of
all EPDs, but rather on some complex relationship among
them, and that EPDs would probably be found to correspond
to preferences for the use of various sense modalities
(although they would go beyond this). Hayes believes that
simple skills associated with the various sense modalities
(primarily perceptual ones) are. with experience, coinbined
into more complex strategies that can then generate
solutions to more complex problems. In other words.
Hayes sees EPDs as determinants of certain types of
environmental encounters which are significant to the
accumulation of specific kinds of abilities, and therefore
both heredity and environment are of 100 per cent importance
in the organism's developing intellectual functions.
In theorizing on the way in which individuals become
increasingly mature in their interpersonal perceptions
and relations. Sullivan, Grant, and Grant (195?) also
emphasize the fundamental importance of the organism
acting upon his environment, and in turn the environment
acting upon the organism. This mutual Interaction of
organism and environment leads to a "nexus of gradually
expanding experience, expectations, hypotheses, and
perceptions which makes up the core of personality
(Sullivan, Grant, and Grant, 1957, p. 373)," and is
dependent upon the genetic predispositions the Infant
brings into the world with him, as well as the stimulation
present in the maturing child's environment. Both Hayes
and the founders of I-level theory, then, stress the
importance of both heredity and environment in their
respective formulations.
for many years investigators of the I-level classifi-
cation system in California have played down the possible
relationship beti\feen I-level and intelligence, citing
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correlations in the low .ao's (Palmer, Johns. Neto. Turner,
and Pearson. I968)
.
More recently, however, independent
investigative efforts have indicated higher degrees of
relationship between I-level a^d intelligence than previously
reported. For instance. Cross and Tracy (I971) found a
correlation of
.36 between I-level and intelligence, a
coefficient quite similar to that reported by Beverly (I965)
in another study, while not citing actual coefficients.
Kolof and Jesness (1972) present data which "shows a high
degree of relationship between measured intelligence and
I-level (Kolof and Jesness. 1972. p. 68)." Werner (1972)
presents data which indicate a "moderate" degree of rela-
tionship, citing a gamma value of .34. These figures seem
reasonable in terms of I-level theory; however, one might
not expect to find such strong correlations between these
two dimensions as those reported by Zaidel in I970 (verbal
r =
.59, non-verbal r = .52). Zaldel's figures are the
highest cited in the literature.
In line with Hayes' and other (e.g.. Piaget) theoretical
formulations of intelligence, as well as the concepts
imbedded in I-level theory, a correlation between I-level
and intelligence should not be surprising. As noted by
Molof and Jesness, the concepts of perceptual development
and cognitive differentiation, and the ability to understand
and cope with one' inner and outer worlds should theoretically
have in common certain of the attributes measured by tests
of intelligence. It also seems reasonable that intelligence
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may affect the extent to which persons are able to accurately
perceive and effectively react to Individual differences In
the needs, motives, values, and styles of verbal as well as
nonverbal expression of others, since these latter qualities
of interpersonal functioning undoubtedly help determine the
nature of Interpersonal relations developed by an Individual
(and perhaps also the extent of growth-conducive social
opportunities available to him), at least a moderate correla-
tion between I-level and Intelligence would not be unexpected.
The relatively few references to cognitive functioning
m the descriptions given of the various I-level categories
do suggest differences In Intelligence. For example, I-2s
are described as having an "undifferentiated view of others"
except In terms of whether the others are seen as "givers"
or "denlers" and low ability to differentiate Is generally
considered a characteristic of low intelligence. "Cognltlvely
concrete" is a description given of I-3s, which also suggests
a relatively low level of cognitive functioning. The only
cognitive description given of is that they have
"potential for considerable Insight into meanings, dynamics,
cause and effect," which suggests a higher degree of intell-
igence. These descriptions and accompanying expected Increases
in intelligence across levels are compatible with the expec-
tations of the cognitive-developmental models described
previously,
Zaidel points out that the treatment recommendations
for the various I-level groups are consistent with the
notion of differences in intelligence across I-levels.
Traditional approaches to psychotherapy, for instance, are
not considered appropriate for I-2s and I-3s; rather, role-
playing techniques, activity groups, and groups emphasizing
the influence of a positive peer culture are recommended.
In contrast, the major treatment methods recommended for
the large number of l-i^s are individual psychotherapy,
group therapy, conjoint family therapy, transactional
analysis, etc., with an emphasis on the development of
insight into conflicts, internal dynamics and feelings,
and family problems. This differential use of insight-
oriented therapy is consistent with the general clinical
finding that traditional psychotherapy requires a fair
amount of intelligence, which it is possible that I-2s
and I-3s may not have.
The point to be made from this discussion is that
while the devotees of I-level classification do not con-
sider intelligence to be an important or even notable
diagnostic indicant of the level of interpersonal maturity
of a youth, the theory itself and the differential treat-
ment strategies suggested, do in fact point directly to
a significant positive relationship between I-level and
Intelligence.
Chapter III
BATIONALE
As noted in a previous section, since the major con-
cern of research in I-level theory over the past years
has been to assess the usefulness of the classification
system for the treatment of juvenile offenders, questions
related to the construct validity of the underlying theory
have essentially remained uninvestigated. Several excep-
tions to this are three social work master's degree
studies, reported by Zaidel (1970), which apparently were
too inadequate methodologically to allow any conclusions
to be drawn. One other exception is a recent (1970) study
by Susan Zaidel in which she addressed herself to the
construct validity questions of differences across three
I-level groups in awareness of feelings in others, and the
relationship of intelligence to I-level classification.
Among other findings, her results indicated that verbal
fluency regarding people, verbal intelligence, and race
were the most Important components of I-level, together
accounting for approximately 5^ per cent of the variance
in her study. This type of study is obviously very
important and leads to a number of questions regarding the
theoretical base of I-level classification.
In regard to the relationship between I-level and
intelligence, Loevlnger (19^6) has reasoned that ego
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.ons
development Is not the same as development of all functl
exercised by the ego. and
-in particular intellectual
development is not a fair measure of ego development,
even though exercise of Intelligence is an ego function
(Loevinger. I966. p. 195) While the present xiriter is
sympathetic to this kind of reasoning, it may well be. at
least for the present, that intelligence is the best measure
available for assessing I-level or ego development. If
this Indeed is the case (Zaidel found a correlation of
.59
between I-level and Intelligence as measured by the Haven
Progressive Matrices and a separate verbal measure of I.Q.).
then perhaps it is not necessary to perform the elaborate,
time-consuming interview presently used in arriving at
I-level diagnoses. Rather, it may be sufficient to use a
good measure of intelligence alone or in combination with
one or two other indices proven to be related significantly
to I-level. Adapting this procedure for assessing I-level
need not necessarily imply that I-level theory is not
valid or useful. Indeed, the present writer is of the
opinion that the usefulness of I-level classification has
been satisfactorily demonstrated in terms of its effective-
ness for the management and differential treatment of
juvenile offenders. Questions remain, however, as to the
relationship between I-level and intelligence as well as
to the importance of the constructs reputedly central to
I-level (see Table 1). It seems necessary to evaluate those
constructs in relation to the degree to which they in fact
do differentiate persons at various levels of development
within this system. Referring to Table 1. then, the
following assumptions of I-level theory are considered
for investigation. It should be noted that for ease of
reference these statem.ents are labeled as hypotheses;
however, for this kind of study a more proper and accurate
procedure would be to describe empirical tests of relation
ships between measures of the various constructs.
SZ2£th^esis_l: Youths at hig-her levels of inter-
personal maturity are more internally_jrrl_g.rTt^
in relation to control of their lives, i.e.,
they are more inclined to interpret important
reinforcements as consequences of their own
behavior, rather than due to extrinsic factors
in the environment
. Youths at Level 2 in
development feel they have no control at all
over their ovm destiny and that they are
completely at the mercy of their environment.
At Level 3, youths feel they have some limited
power to affect what happens to them, although
they are still concerned with who has the poi/er
at any given m.oment, and in relating to that
pox^^er. Level k youths give evidence of a
greater internal orientation than youths at
lower levels due to their feeling that they
can control their ovm destiny, and. because of
the existence of an internalized value system.
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Hypothesis 2
: Yojiths at hiP,her l.vels of mtP.-
£ersonaa_n^ are mor^ no^nltlvely nnnnj^^
tha-n those at .IqweiL levels of development.
At Level 2, youths denonstrate very concrete
thinking, a tendency toward stereotypy, and
little ability to differentiate between
persons and objects in the environment.
Youths at Level 3 give evidence of conceptual
simplicity and are capable of making super-
ficial differentiations. Level k youths
demonstrate conceptual complexity with the
Idea that there is a patterning and organiza-
tion of responses, and are more capable of
abstract reasoning than youths at lower
levels on the continuum.
Hypothesis,^; Youths at higher levels of Intf^r-
personal maturity have internalized their
own standards and values and therefore
experience greater internalized guilt. Youths
at Level 2 have little, if any conception of
right and wrong and for them an action is bad
because it is punished. Level 3 youths obey
rules just because they are the rules, and
the guilt they experience is situational,
resulting from breaking rules. Youths
Integrated at Level ^ have self- evaluated
standards, an internalized morality, and
experience more intense feelings of guilt when
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they do not live up to their self-imposed
stand ards.
H;s:£0thesi^ Yoijjh^^higher level ._ofj_v^^_
^ilg^Ulouth^^^ levels Of d eveloT.r..^jv_
Control of impulses is said to be lacking or
at best undependable in persons at Level 2.
Level 3 youths' impulse control is better
established, yet still quite susceptible to
peer influence. ?or youths at Level 4,
Impulse control is dependable and less
susceptible to peer persuasion than at
Level 3.
Hypothesis
^5: Youths at hi,^her level .9 of inter-
personal ^turity are more able to del^v
gratificati on than youths at lower levels.
Level 2 youths are basically oriented tox^^ard
having iiranediate gratification of needs and
are not able to delay gratification for even
very brief periods of time. Youths at
Level 3 can postpone gratification if not
required to do so very long. At Level ^,
long-term goals and ideals are expressed
and youths at this level are able to delay
reward for extended periods of time.
Hyr)othesis 6 : Youths at hig:her levels of inter-
personal maturity possess c^reater ability to
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exercise foresln:ht and plan behavior. Youths
at Level 2 are "time-bound" x^ith little axmre-
ness of past and future events. Level 3
youths have the ability to exercise foresight
to a limited extent, but are not motivated
to achieve in a long-range sense, or to plan
for the future. Youths at Level in develop-
ment possess an ability to evaluate past,
present, and future influence, are motivated
to plan for the future, and demonstrate
greater foresightf ulness and planned behavior
than youths at lower levels.
Hypotheses 7 and 8 ; following Zaidel, the prediction
is made that there is a significant positive
relationship between I-level diagnosis and
verbal and non-verbal intellip:ence
. An
extension of these related hypotheses may be
viewed as the Devil's Advocate hypothesis of
the present study: ^'hen systematic grou^
differences in intelligence are controlled
by matching or statistical procedures, all of
the differences predicted above disappear.
As noted above, confirmation of this and at
least some other hypotheses x\rould imply that
there is some utility to I-level assessments,
but that simple intelligence tests would
perhaps have equivalent utility as the pro-
cedures for classification.
Chapter IV
METHOD
Sub.lects
The sample consisted of 138 male and female youth
offenders ranging in age from I3 to 21 years, the majority
of whom were Incarcerated In two training schools which
serve the courts of the State of Colorado for confinement
of juvenile offenders. Subjects were divided into three
groups according to their I-level classification: 1-2,
1-3, and Due to the scarcity of I-2s In the correctional
population (less than 5 per cent as reported in the California
Youth Authority), and a preponderance of I-3s and I-^s, the
three groups did not contain equal numbers of subjects.
Since only six I-2s were available from the Colorado
population, thirty -five additional subjects were procured
from the Northern Reception Center and Clinic in Sacramento,
California, nine of whom were identified as I-2s. These
nine additional California youths were added to the Colorado
sample of I-2s, as well as I3 California I-3s and 13 I-^s,
resulting in the following number of subjects in each group:
15 I-2s, 55 I-3s, and 68 I-^s. Approximately 35 per cent
of the total number of subjects were female, all of whom
were from the Colorado sample.
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Measures
I-level d1ae_no^. I-level diagnoses are currently
available for a majority of the delinquent correctional
population m Colorado. These diagnoses are established
by raters who have been thoroughly trained (many by ,/arren
and her staff m a five-week training course In Sacramento)
m I-level theory. Interviewing, and diagnosis, and whose
ratings have been validated against criterion tapes In
California. Described by V/arren (I966). interviewers
trained in I-level diagnosis conduct a tape-recorded one
to one-and-a-half hour semi-structured interview designed
to elicit the interviewee's characteristic level of
perceptual differentiation as well as his typical reactions
or response sets to his perceptions (see Appendix A). The
interviewer determines the diagnosis followed by a second
trained rater listening to the taped interview and also
making a diagnosis. Molof (I969) reports an average of
82 percent agreement in terms of level diagnosis between
first and second raters using the Warren interview.
Intelligence
. Verbal and non-verbal (performance)
scores from the iVechsler Intelligence Scale for Children
(V/ISC) (i/echsler, 19^9) were available for most of the
youths in the study, ,/hen l/ISC scores were not available,
verbal and non-verbal scores from the Lorge-Thorndlke were
used
.
Internal- external focus
. Subjects were administered
the Rotter Internal- eternal Focus of Control Scale
(Rotter, 1966). Locus of control refers to the disposition
to perceive one's reinforcements as consequences of one's
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own behavior or as due to extrinsic factors. Those persons
;^ho believe that they exercise some control over their
destinies are considered to be internally oriented and
controlled. Externals believe that their reinforcements
are controlled by luck, chance, fate, or powerful others.
A wide variety of construct validity is available for this
measure. It has been used rather extensively and research
findings indicate that it has proved to be useful in the
prediction of a variety of behaviors. A bibliography of
the locus of control literature through I969 cites over
325 references, indicating a considerable amount of
continuing interest in this construct (Throop and flacDonald,
1971).
In addition to the I-E scale administered to the
subjects, two or three people who knew respective subjects
fairly well (e.g., house parents, cottage counselors) were
asked to fill out brief informal rating scales with
behavioral descriptions of the concepts central to this
internal- external dimension. These scales are listed in
Appendix B.
Cognitive complexity. David Hunt (1970) has devised
a method for assessing the conceptual level or cognitive
complexity of adolescents from 12 to 18 years of age. To
index conceptual level Hunt writes that "we have used a
method that requires the person to do some 'conceptual work'
by reacting to a stimulus likely to require some 'cognitive
v;ork' in his response (p. 71)." Specifically, Hunt's
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Paragraph Completion Method consists of six topics, to each
of which the subject responds with three or four sentences
Indicating his own personal reactions to the topics. The
topics are: "What I think about rules
. . ; ..uhen I am
criticized
. .
.";'V;hat I think about parents "When
someone disagrees with me
. .
."
; "When I am not sure
. .
."
;
and "V/hen I am told what to do
. . Each of the six
responses Is a unit to be coded according to the scoring
manual (Hunt, Lapln, Llberman. McManus. Post, Saballs, Sweet,
and Victor, I968)
.
A person's Index of cognitive complexity
is calculated as a composite of his six scores, generally
using the average of the highest three scores on the test.
i;ith trained raters. Hunt reports Inter-rater reliability
to be .80 to .85. Several studies are cited as evidence of
the construct validity of this approach (e.g.. Hunt and
Dopyera, I966; Hunt, Hardt, and Victor, I968; r4cLachlan,
1969) , and this plus the fact that the measure was devised
to be used with adolescents, as well as the apparent
similarity between Hunt's stages of cognitive complexity
and the I-level stages being investigated, indicate Hunt's
instrument is an appropriate measure for determining cognitive
complexity.
An additional measure of cog-nitlve complexity was
several informal rating scales containing descriptions of
concepts involved in the dimension of conceptual complexity.
These were administered to people who were in contact with
the respective subjects and x^ho Imew the youths fairly well.
These scales are presented in Appendix C.
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Internalization of ^uilt
. Kosher (Kosher, I966; x^uma
and Mosher. I967) has developed a scale which purports to
measure a person's generalized expectancy for self
-mediated
punishment for violating or anticipating the violation of
internalized stajidards of proper behavior. The Mosher Guilt
Scale (KGS) was originally developed as a sentence-completion
measure of guilt using referents suggested by the psycho-
analytic conception of guilt to score the completions. From
the Mosher Incomplete Sentence Test, a forced-choice and
true-false measure of three aspects of guilt were constructed
(1966)
.
The forced-choice alternatives (79 items) were
subjected to an internal consistency item analysis and
matched for social desirability in college males. A
multitrait-multlmethod matrix analysis of the three measures
of the three aspects of guilt (sex guilt, hostile guilt,
and morality-conscience guilt) revealed that the forced-
choice version of the MGS has a high split-half reliability
(in the .90' s) and provided evidence of convergent and
discriminant validity (Mosher, I966) . Huma and Kosher
(1967) later showed a significant correlation (p<.01)
between level of guilt (as measured by the MGS) and level
of moral judgment (as measured by Kohlberg's method of
assessing the developmental level of moral judgment) in
delinquent boys. This reported correlation with a construct
embedded in a developmental model and with a delinquent
population indicates the KGS is an appropriate measure
for internalized guilt in the present study.
.s
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An additional measure of guilt which was utilized 1;
several rating scales, administered to house parents, cas,
^'orkers. etc. who were familiar with the subjects, vjhioh
described various aspects of the dimension of internalized
guilt. These scales are given in Appendix D.
Impulse control. fores ig:ht. and ability to pl^n. The
non-verbal Porteus Maze tests (Porteus, I965) have been
used in several studies (Erikson and Roberts. I97I; Doctor
and Winder, 195^; Fooks and Thomas. 1957) to differentiate
between various groups differing in impulsiveness, foresight,
and planfulness. This test provides two scores: a Test
Quotient (TQ) which appears to measure non-verbal foresight
and planning ability, and a Qualitative (Q) score which is
a measure of impulse control and has been demonstrated to
differentiate between groups on this dimension. Erikson
and Robert (1971) found a correlation of .03 between TQ
and intelligence, v;hile the correlation between Q and
intelligence was .00. both obviously not significantly
different from zero. In their study, TQ and Q correlated
.31 (p< .05). Porteus (1965) noted that delinquents who
were given the mazes seemed to enjoy taking the test, and
he cited numerous studies using his test with delinquent
populations. In fact Porteus devised the Q score to take
account of the frequency of errors in execution he found
among various delinquent and nondelinquent populations.
While Porteus considers the concepts of impulse control
and foresight in his book, he does not claim that his
es
ons
test measures these abilities, although he does cite studi
other than his own, which indicate the mazes are sensitive
to these factors (e.g.. Kainer, I965)
. These considerati
coupled With later investigative efforts using the Porteus
Maze Tests (e.g.. Erikson and Roberts. 197I)
.
suggest it is
an appropriate measure to be used with delinquents and in
differentiating groups on these two dimensions.
Delay of gratification
. The measure used to determine
ability to postpone gratification was a choice-of-prizes
test made popular by N. T. Feather (1959). Subjects were
informed at the beginning of the first testing session that
they would each receive :^2.0Q for participation in the
experiment. At the end of the first session, however, each
subject was individually presented a card, with the following
options
:
Alternative 1 Alternative 2
1st week
^ .75 ^ .25
2nd week ^U.25 $2.00
Total :$2.00 ;;^2.25
Those subjects who decided upon the second alternative were
considered to delay gratification. This is a simple measure
yet effective in Its differentiation of those subjects who
are able to control their impulses and those who demand
iMnedlate gratification.
Proced ure
Rotter's I-E scale, the Kosher Guilt Scale, and Hunt's
sentence com.pletion measure of cognitive complexity were
if6
administered to groups of 10 to I5 subjects at a time.
Administration of these three measures averaged about one-
and-one-half hours per group. Administration of Feather's
test was carried out individually at the end of this first
sesslon.l One week later, individual sessions were arranged
with each subject for administration of the Porteus Maze
Tests and the completion of payment for the Feather choice-
of-prlzes task. Instructions were the standard ones accompany-
Ing the five measures. (See Appendixes F through K for
measures and instructions.) Subjects, at the beginning of
the first testing session, were offered
.^2.00 for partici-
pating in the experiment. The Experimenter asked the
subjects to be as honest as possible and assured them of
the confidentiality of their responses to the various tests
( See Appendix F )
.
The informal rating scales measuring the observations
of house parents, cottage counselors, etc. of each of the
subjects on the dimensions of internal- external locus of
control, cognitive complexity, and internalization of guilt
(plus one additional scale which was used in order to
assess possible contamination due to the observer's fondness
or dislike for individual subjects, see Appendix E) were
combined into one rating form and administered to two or
three of these observers for each subject. The adminlstra-
Due to restrictions concerning the payment of
money to youths in the Northern Reception Center and Clinic,
it vias not possible to administer the Feather delay of
gratification measure to the California subjects.
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tlon took Place as close as possible to the tl.e when subjects
were administered the first phase of the experimental tasks.
Observers filling out rating sheets were assured of the
confidentiality of their responses.
Treatment of Data
A preliminary analysis was performed to assess the
comparability of the data from the California and Colorado
subjects. A state-by-I-level analysis of variance for each
dependent variable was performed and in no case was the
state-by
-l-level interaction term significant, indicating
that the two samples could Justifiably be combined for futher
analysis.
Several previous studies had indicated that age (Ilolof
.
1969) and ethnic background (Zaidel. 197O; Cross and Tracy,
I97I) were important correlates of I-level. In addition,
the present study included both male and female subjects,
providing an opportunity for an analysis of possible sex
differences and I-level which had not been examined to any
significant degree in other studies. To examine the possible
effects of age, sex. and ethnic background on the present
I-level data, an initial correlation matrix was derived for
the independent and dependent measures. A subsequent analysis
was then performed to partial out the differences due to age,
sex, and ethnic background. The partial correlation matrix
revealed a slight reduction of some of the higher original
correlations, and a slight raise of some of the lower ones,
but had no substantial effect on the p values associated
48
with the tests of the principal hypotheses. Appendix L
presents a summary of the correlation coefficients for the
original and partialed data. The tests of the principal
hypotheses in the results section were performed by analysis
of variance since the correlational analyses included some
scores whose conformance to parametric assumptions is
questionable. Nevertheless, the partial correlation matrix
was sufficiently convincing to make it unnecessary to covary
out the effects of these differences due to sex, age, and
ethnic background in the analyses of variance in the tests
of the principal hypotheses.
Previous studies iiad also indicated a significant
correlation between I-level and socio-economic status (SE3).
Using a modified version of Ilollingshead and Redlich's Index
of Social Position (I958), an attempt was made to collect
SES data for each subject. Unfortunately, this effort
proved successful for slightly less than half of the total
number of subjects, and. consequently the SES data could not
be Included for formal analysis. A preliminary one-way
analysis of variance, however, indicated that, at least for
the subjects with SES data available, SES was not an important
influence on I-level classification (F = O.3I, 2 and 5^ d.f
,
ns) .
A description of the analyses performed to test the
eight principal hypotheses, as well as subsequent analyses
of the data, is presented immediately below.
Chapter V
RESULTS
In the first part of this section, analyses of variance
will be presented in order to test the eight principal
hypotheses advanced in Chapter III. For three of the
hypotheses, alternative measures were available: a ques-
tionnaire measure and a behavioral rating. The initial
tests of the hypotheses, then, consist of eleven analyses
of variance. The order of presentation of the hypotheses
has no particular significance, i.e., as a construct,
internal locus of control is not necessarily more central
to I-level theory than, for instance, impulse control.
The second part of the section will consist of analyses
to further delineate and clarify the results shown from the
tests of the principal hypotheses. These will consist of
a multltrait-multimethod matrix analysis of the duplicate
measures, a factor analysis of the dependent measures, a
discriminant function analysis of the dependent measures,
and a comparative analysis of alternative measures to I-level
classification.
Tests of Principal Hypotheses
The first hypothesis stated that youths at higher
levels of interpersonal maturity are more internally oriented
in relation to control of their lives
.
i.e., they are more
k9
)rs
.re
igs
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inclined to mt.r.r.f, 1 Try.ortanl_relnf^^^^ as 0.0...,
.^.^
Of their own behavior rather than 6u. ..^^^^ nslc facto-
m the environment
, m addition to the Hotter questlonnal:
measure of locus of control (I-E Scale), behavioral ratin.
were obtained for each subject on the internal-. external
dimension. Table 2 presents the means and analyses of
variance of locus of control on three I-level groups for
both measures.
There appears to be some tendency for more mature
(higher I-level) youths to be more Internally oriented,
although the questionnaire results are far less convincing
than the behavioral ratings.
The second hypothesis stated that youths at higher
levels of interpersonal maturity are more cog,-nltively com-
plex than those at lower levels of development
. Table 3
presents the means and analysis of variance for three
I-level groups on Hunt's paragraph completion measure of
cognitive complexity (CC)
,
as well as for the behavioral
ratings obtained for each subject on this construct.
Both of these analyses strongly confirm the second
hypothesis of greater cognitive complexity among youths at
higher levels of interpersonal maturity.
Hypothesis 3 claimed that youths at higher levels of
interpersonal maturity have internalized their own standards
and values and therefore experience greater internalized
guilt than youths at lower levels
. Table 4 presents means
and analysis of variance for Hosher's Guilt Scale (FOS) on
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Table 2
KEANS AND ANALYSES OF VARIANCE OF LOCUS OF CONTROL
FOR THREE I-LEVEL GROUPS
I-Level Group Rotter I-i^ sn..i . Behavioral R^tin..
^^e^ SD Mean SD
= 11.80 2.51 13.69 2.62
1-3 (n = 55) 10.69 3.36 12.13 2.58
I-^ (n = 68) 10.06 if. 08 10.62 2.3^+
F-test (2, 135 df) F = 1.68, ns F = 11.6?. p< .001
Note.— A high score indicates external locus of control.
Table 3
MEANS AND ANALYSES OF VAHIAN-CE OF COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY
FOH THREE I-LEYEL GROUPS
^^^^^lSl-Gr£U£ Hunt CC Measure Behavioral Hatin.
1-2 (n = 15) 0.55 0.34
1-3 (n = 55) 1.07 0.27
9.53 2.35
10.75 3.06
'-"^
= 1-^2 0.49 12.96 2.50
F-test (2, 135 df) ? = 32.23. p< .001 F = I5.O8, p< .001
high score Indicates greater cognitive coraplexity.
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Table k
MEANS AND ANALYSES OF VARIANCE OF INTERNALIZED GUILT
FOR THREE I-LEVEL GROUPS
I-Level GrouD jlogher Gullt^cale Behavioral Rati..
Mm SD Meaji SD
1-2 (n = 15) .4.53 15.60 10.49 2.35
= 0-95 15.^3 11.65 1.88
I-^ (n = 68) 0.09 19.17 12.38 1.67
F-test (2, 135 df) F = 0.58, ns f = 7.10, p< .01
Note. -A high score Indicates more internalized guilt.
5^
three I-level groups, and for the behavioral ratings obtained
as an alternative measure of Internalized guilt.
As measured by the Mosher questionnaire, internalized
guilt is clearly not related to I-level. The groups do diff
reliably on the behavioral rating of this variable, but sub-
sequent analysis will show that this result must be treated
with some skepticism. It is concluded that the I-level
groups do not differ on internalized guilt.
A fourth hypothesis stated that youths at higher levels
of interpersonal maturity have greater impulse control than
youths at lower levels of development. Table 5 presents
means and analysis of variance for the performance of three
I-level groups on the Porteus I'.azes (Q-score), a measure of
impulse control.
The large F-ratio in this analysis indicates a highly
significant relationship between Impulse control and levels
of interpersonal maturity, vjhich confirms the original
hypothesis.
The fifth hypothesis stated that youths at higher levels
of interpersonal maturity are more able to delay Rratifica-
tlon than youths at lower levels
. Table 6 presents means
and analysis of variance for Feather's Cholce-of-Prlzes
Test on I-levels 2, 3, and 4.
The overall analysis of variance falls to confirm the
hypothesis, although the 1-2 group differs significantly
(p < .001) from both other groups. This is in line with
the prediction, but this result must be regarded with some
er
Table 5
MEANS AND ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF IMPULSE CONTHOL
(POHTEUS Q SCORK) FOR THREE I-LfiVEL GROUPS
I-Level Group Mean SD
1-2 (n = 15) 3Z^..27 16.86
1-3 (n = 55) 23.16 i3.6Af
I-^ (n - 68) 17.63 10.13
Note.
-A low score indicates more impulse control.
The F-ratio between groups was 11.35,
2. 135 df. p < .001.
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Table 6
MEANS MID ANALYSIS OP VAHIAiNCh; OF DELAY OP GflATIFICATION
(FEATHER CHOICE-OF-PRIZES TEST) FOR THREE I-LEVEL GROUPS
1-Level Group Mean SD
1-2 (n = 6) 1.17 0.37
1-3 (n = ^4-2) 1.60 0.k9
(n = 55) 1.62 0.^9
Note.- A high score indicates greater delay of gratifica-
tion.
The F-ratio between groups was 2.33, 2, 100 df, ns.
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reservation because of the very small sample in the 1-2
group (6)
.
A Sixth hypothesis posited that youths at hl .h.. ..r^
.
of
.
interpersonal maturity nn.c... ^
^eater ability t.r. ........
foresight and Dlanbeha^ Table 7 presents means and
analysis of variance for the performance of three I-level
groups on the Porteus Hazes Test (TQ score)
. a behavioral
measure of foresight and planning ability.
The significant relationship between levels of inter-
personal maturity and foresight confirms the hypothesis that
youths at higher levels of development demonstrate a greater
ability to plan behavior.
Two final hypotheses were addressed to the relationship
of I-level classification and intelligence. These predicted
a significant positive relationship between I-level and
verbal intelligence, on the one hand, and non-verbal
(performance) Intelligence on the other. Table 8 presents
the means and analyses of variance for verbal and non-verbal
(performance) I.Q., as measured by the Wechsler Intelligence
Scale for Children (WISC), for I-levels 2, 3, and k.
The large ?-ratio in both of these analyses indicates
a highly significant positive relationship between I-level
diagnosis and both verbal and non-verbal (performance)
Intelligence, as measured by the WISC.
Multitrait-Kultimethod Matrix Analysis of Duplicate Measures
Due to the nature of the results bearing on the constructs
of locus of control and internalized guilt, in which the
Table 7
MEAJIS iLND AMALYSI3 OF VAHIAiMCE OF FORESIGHT
(PORTEUS TQ SCORE) FOR THREE I-LEVEL GROUPS
SD
I-Level Groirn Kean
1-2 (n = 15) 10/^.. 80 16.90
1-3 (n = 55) 112.2^ 15.68
I-^ (n = 68) 119. i^0 12.81
Note.
-A high score indicates more foresight.
The F-ratio between groups was 7.68,
2, 135 d.f. p < .001.
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Table 8
MEANS AMD ANALYSES OF VAHIAflCE OF
.ISC INTEILIGEIKS
FOR THHEE I-LEVEL GflOUPS
I-Level Orniin Verbal to r, ^v oai i.q. Performance 1.9 .
1-2 (n = 15) 76.07 12.16 77.O7 I5.9I
1-3 (n = 51) 83.90 10. 92.08 16. li^
l-l* (n = 68) 97.00 10.67 m.in 12.15
P-test (2. 131 df) F=34.53. p< .001 F=26.36. p< .001
a;es
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questionnaire measures and behavioral ratings elicited
discrepant relationships with I-level classification,
further analysis was performed to clarify these difference
m the two methods of measurement. Kultitrait-multimethod
matrii. analysis (Campbell and Fiske. 1959) has been pro-
posed for situations such as this, in which Intercorrelations
of more than one trait each measured by more than one method
are appraised for evidence of convergent and discriminant
validity. Campbell and Fiske noted that tests can be
considered as combinations of method ajid trait variance in
different proportions. Thus, quite aside from specific
content, reliable variance may be elicited by measurement
procedures which are logically, although not operationally,
distinct from content. Table 9. then, presents a multitralt-
multimethod matrix analysis of the alternate measures of
locus of control (I-E)
,
cognitive complexity (CC) , and
internalized guilt (IG)
. The two methods of measurement
used, questionnaire and behavior ratings, are designated
in the table, respectively, as Instrument and rated variables.
Before evaluating the matrix, it should be noted that
this is an unusual use of the multltralt-multimethod approach
because the Instrument variables are not measured by exactly
the same mthods. Two of the Instruments are forced-choice
questionnaires, while the other is an incomplete sentences
test. However, they do share in common the written format
and can logically be expected to correlate with intelligence.
In this sense they are considered to share the same method
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of measurement. The rated variables more obviously shar.
the same method because the ratings for all three trait:
were made by the same judges in each case.
Several informal criteria have been proposed by Campbell
and Fiske for evaluating the multitrait-multimethod matrix.
One of these is that the heteromethod convergent validities
should be statistically significant and high enough to
warrant further consideration of their validity. The
mtercorrelations on the validity diagonals presented in
Table 9 meet these criteria (p < .01), giving evidence of
acceptable convergent validity for both the instrument and
rated measures ofthe three constructs. Another criterion
is that convergent validities should be higher than inter-
correlations between the test and the irrelevant variables,
which would be expected to share neither trait nor method
variance. In the present matrix this condition is also met
satisfactorily, except for the correlations of instrument
CG with rated I-E (-.29) and rated IG (.2?). The consis-
tently high correlations of all the rated variables with
Instrument CC suggests that some informal (perhaps uncon-
scious) assessment of the youth's cognitive complexity
invests all of the judgments by the cottage staff and case-
workers.
A further criterion is that the intercorrelations
should be higher with relevant traits measured by independent
methods than with irrelevant traits measured by a common
method. This condition refers to the discriminant validity
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Of the methods being used. Referring to the momomethod
matrices In the lower right and upper left quadrants of
Table 9, It is apparent that this criterion Is not met.
Rather, the heterotralt-monomethod correlations are higher
than the monotralt-heteromethod correlations (the validity
coefficients In parentheses) for all the rated variables
and for the Instrument assessment of l-E with IG. The
only monomethod correlations that meet the criterion are
those for Instrument assessment of CC with I-E and with IG.
It Is feasible that the heterotralt-monomethod correlation
of
-.28 between Instrument I-E and IG may be because they
share the same test format (forced-choice). Each of these
correlated only .02 with the sentence completion measure
of cognitive complexity (CC).
The excellent discriminant validity for Instrument CC
strongly affirms the construct validity of I-level with
regard to this variable. The mixed discriminant validity
for Instrument IG and I-E has- little consequence for this
study since neither validated I-level theory In the Initial
analyses presented here. However, the lack of discriminant
validity for the behavioral ratings Is disturbing because
they unequivocally validated I-level theory In all three
respects. This, plus their consistently high correlation
with Instrument CC, raises the ominous prospect that the
Devil may have more to say about Intelligence than this
study otherwise can show for Interpersonal maturity.
6k
What is being suggested here. In part, is that method
variance In the form of possible "halo" and "leniency-
effects m the behavior ratings (see Berkshire. 195S) may
have been responsible for not allowing the raters to
discriminate sufficiently among the various constructs
being measured. It may have been, for instance, that the
raters were primarily responding to their assessment of a
youth's cognitive complexity, and then "unconsciously"
Judging him on the dimensions of Internalized guilt and
locus of control in a way which would fit their prior
assessment of his cognitive traits. On the other hand, the
observers may have made their ratings higher or lower on
the three variables simply in terms of whether they
personally liked or disliked the youths. The preference
or liking rating Included among the items on the behavior
rating form (see Appendix E) was included as a control
for this type of possible "halo" effect, an analysis of
which may help clarify the nature of the rater judgments.
To this end, a correlational analysis of the preference
rating was performed. For ease of comparison. Table 10
presents both the original correlation matrix of the
preference or liking variable with the three instrument
and three rated, variables, and a partial correlation matrix
of these six variables with liking for the youth partlaled
out
.
The significant correlations between liking and the
three rating variables indicate a substantial amount of
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"halC effect in the ratings. However, removing the effect
Of personal li.ing
.i, not decrease the validity coefficients
Of the rated variables. Apparently the rater's personal
attachment to the child cannot explain the correlation of
the ratings with interpersonal maturity level.
Since personal liking is only one of many variables
Which ca. contribute to
-halo., effects, and since a positive
correlation was noted between the liking rating and the
instrument measure of CC (r =
.1^4-. 1, 136 df. p < .10), it
continued to seem possible, as suggested above, that the
raters were responding to the level of cognitive complexity
of a youth, and then rating him accordingly on the other
two constructs, m support of this notion, other studies
have shovm (see Foster. Horn and V/anberg. 1972) that
frequently when raters judge a person favorably or unfavorably
on a dimension which is personally important to them, it is
consequently very difficult for them to avoid adjusting
their ratings on the other dimensions being evaluated to
correspond with their favorable or unfavorable perceptions
of the person on the dimension which they consider most
important.
As a further consideration of possible contribution
to "halo" effect in the present study, a correlation of .16
was found between the liking rating and verbal intelligence
(P < .05). Conceivably the raters may have been responding
primarily to the intelligence of the youths in making their
judgements, or perhaps to a combination of the effects of
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Of verbal I.Q. and cognitive level, m an attempt, then, to
further clarify the bases for the rater Judgments, an
additional analysis of the rater variables was performed.
Table 11 presents the results obtained «hen the effects due
to cognitive complexity and verbal I.Q. are removed from the
behavioral ratings.
As is obvious from the table, the reasoning that
supported the supposition that either cognitive complexity
or verbal I.Q. or both were significantly influencing the
rater judgments is clearly discredited. Rather, the resultant
reduction in the size of the validity coefficients of the
rated variables is minimal.
In conclusion, taking all of these analyses together
with the lack of discriminant validity shox^ for the ratings.
It is virtually impossible to justify a claim of construct
validation for I-level for the constructs of locus of control
and internalized guilt on the basis alone of the significant
relationships shown between the rater variables of these two
constructs and I-level in the F-tests of the principal
hypotheses. In other words, it is concluded that the rating
data support the validity of I-level theory in a general
way but hard.ly indicate much specific construct validity.
Something consistent with the theory was tapped by the
ratings, but it is difficult to delineate precisely what
that vias. It will be Important to include these rated
variables in the more complicated analyses which follow,
and to observe them closely for possible clues regarding
their Interpretation,
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Table 11
SUMMARY OF CORRELATIONAL A.IALYSES OF l^TEE VARIABLES WITH
COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY PARTIAL.ED OOT ALONE AI.D COGNITIVE
COMPL-aiT AND VERBAL I.Q. PARTIALED OUT TOGETHER
Cofrnltlve Compleyltv Partialf>d Out
Hater Variables
CC I-E IG
CC 1.00
-.73 <8
Rater ^ '^^
M 4 ^"^ --"^^ 1.00 -AkVariables
.58 ^Ak 1.00
Cop:nltlve Complexity and Verbal I.Q
Partlaled Out Tonrether
Rater
Variables
Rater Variables
CC I-E IG
CC 1.00
-.7^
.58
I-E 1.00
IG
.58 'Ah 1.00
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Factor Analy8l,s__^^^ent Keasurei
Factor analysis is mainly important because of its
usefulness in the clarification of constructs. Accordin;.
to Nunnally (I967), the first step in the explication of
constructs is to develop measures of particular attributes
Which are thought to be related to the construct (in I-
level theory, such attributes as locus of control,
cognitive complexity, ability to delay gratification,
etc.). The second step is to correlate scores on the
different measures considered important. These correla-
tions are then analyzed to determine whether 1) all the
measures are dominated by one common factor. 2) all the
measures are dominated by specific factors, or 3) the
measures tend to break up into a number of common factors
(Nunnally. I967). if the analysis indicates, for instance,
that item number two is the case, then the third step in
the explication of a construct is to perform experiments
relating that construct to other constructs.
The first part of this section of the data analysis
has been directed toward assessing the nature of the rela-
tionship of particular attributes to I-level classification;
these are attributes which have been theorized to be
Importajit. but have not been shoiMn empirically to be so.
As has been shorn in the previous analyses, most of these
attributes do in fact appear to be significantly related
to I-level. It is appropriate at this point, therefore,
to investigate the specificity or communality of the
variables related to I-level, or as Cattell (I966) has
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described the process, to see "the resolution of many
variables into fewer." Factor analysis is a useful tool
for this kind of construct validation and provides a means
by which the dimensionality of the present data can be
viewed more parsimoniously.
For a broad examination of the relationships that
existed amons the larger pool of variables an intercorrela-
tion matrix was obtained for 25 variables. An 11 by 11
submatrix of the major variables considered central to
I-level theory was extracted from this larger matrix for
further analysis. (The delay of gratification variable
was omitted due to the ujiavailability of data for a number
of subjects 3ji one of the groups.) Eigenvalues and eigen-
vectors were obtained from this submatrix with a principal
components analysis and four factors were retained with
associated eigenvalues (roots) greater than one (Horn,
1965). A principal factor solution was then derived by
entering the squared multiple correlations of each variable
with all other variables into the diagonal of the matrix
as initial lower-bound communality estimates. Iterations
were then performed (with four factors) until communality
values from immediately preceding solutions converged for
each variable. This procedure has been shown to converge
by Wrlgley (I956), Factors vieve then rotated to an approxi-
mation to simple structure (Thurstone, 19^7), by application
of the Varimax procedure (Kaiser, I958). The four orthogonal
factors provided by this rotation and the respective loadings
in
.on
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for the eleven variables are presented in Table 12. In
discussing the factors, coefficients of .30 or larger will
be given major emphasis in defining a primary factor,
although occasionally, coefficients as low as
.25 will be
used for help in interpreting a factor.
An overall interpretation of the analysis presented i.
Table 12 is that through factoring, four fairly distinct
psychological dimensions have been identified for discussi,
concerning the primary influences operating within I-level
classification, at least for the variables considered in
the present study.
Salient loadings on Factor I include the /ISC measures
of verbal aiid performance I.Q.. as well as Hunt's measure
of cogTiltive complexity. 'This was labeled for the present
study as a factor of general intelligence.
Factor II is primarily a rating factor, i.e.. all of
the items involving the observer ratings come together in
this one factor. This is further evidence for the lack of
discriminant validity of the rater variables, since if they
were discriminating sufficiently, each should load on one
of the other primary factors. Hox^ever. Factor II may or may
not be artlfactual in the sense that the ratings may be
contaminated by some form of "halo" effect or by confusion
of the raters regarding the constructs, but they may just
as possibly represent a factor Important to I-level different-
iation which is not identifiable from the present data. This
latter possibility cannot be discounted until proven otherwise.
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Table 12
FACTOR ANALYSIS: ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF
ELEVEN DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Variable
1. Verbal I.Q. (v/ISC)
2. Performance I.Q. (WISC)
3. Locus of Control
(Rotter I-E Scale)
4. Internalized Guilt
(Kosher Guilt Scale)
5. Cognitive Complexity
(Hunt CC Measure)
6. Foresight (Porteus TQ)
7. Impulse Control (Porteus Q)
8. Rated Locus of Control
(Behavioral I-E Rating)
9. Rated Internalized Guilt
(Behavioral IG Hating)
10. Rated Cognitive Complexity
(Behavioral CC Rating)
11. Rated Liking (Preference)
Factor
I TT11 III IV
.99 .15 .01
.09
70
.05 .27 -.01
• UN' -.18
-.04
-.29
.02 -,04
.01
.93
.52 .18 .00
.Ik 13
. -.03
.22
-.07
-.91 .01
.11
-.75 -.14
-.03
.09 .65 .18 .27
.15 .90 .14 .00
.09 -.04 .02
Factor III obtained salient loadings on the Porteus
Maze measures of impulse control and foresight. This x^as
identified as a factor of performance I.Q., or preferably
a more comprehensive label and related to Vernon's hier-
archical model of intelligence reviewed earlier, as a
spatial-practical-mechanical factor (Vernon, I965)
. This
label is given added credence by the increased loading
on Factor III of the '//ISC measure of performance I.Q.
Factor IV, loaded most highly on the Kosher Guilt
Scale vilth a fair amount of loading on the Rotter I-ii
measure, was identified as a factor of internalized
standards or values. It is of interest that the rater
variable of internalized guilt also loaded fairly highly
on this factor, giving additional evidence for the con-
vergent validity of these two measures of guilt.
Among other considerations, the clustering of these
factors indicates that cognitive complexity covaries v^ith
verbal intelligence. In addition, due to the high loadings
of both of these constructs on Factor I, a further analysis
seemed appropriate in order to clarify the relative import-
ance of each in discriminating between I-level groups.
Discriminant P'unction Analysis of Dependent Measures
Kultiple discriminant analysis (Cooley and Lohnes,
1962) is a statistical technique for deriving linear combina-
tions of variables which yield the majcimum discrimination
among two or more groups. A major advantage of this kind
of analysis in investigations such as the present one is
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that it may isolate combinations of variables which dis-
criminate among groups even in cases where no single
variable is predictive.
In contrast to analysis of variance in which each
predictor variable is treated separately as a dependent
variable, and the F-test indicates whether or not it
discriminated among groups, in discriminant function
analysis predictor variables are examined in company with
each other, and the unique contributions to discrimination
are represented in discriminant weights. In a general
way, discriminant functions are probably more similar to
multiple regression equations than they are to any other
statistical function. In the limiting case of Urn groups,
the discriminant function is virtually equivalent to the
multiple regression equation (VJaters, I970)
.
Suppressor influences are represented in a discriminant
function. For example, if variables A and B both discriminate
between groups and for the same reason (i.e., represent
the same variance)
,
then the discriminant weight for the
one of these variables which discriminates best will be
large and the weight for the other will be small (perhaps
even negative)
.
The variance represented by the tiro
variables is counted only once—in the variance which
represents it best.
These considerations mean, for instance, that if two
variables shovjed significant discrimination when each vias
considered separately by analyses of variance, it is
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possible that only one would have a discriminant weight of
noteworthy size. Only if both represented unique contribu-
tions to the discrimination would both have sizeable dis-
criminant weights. Thus discriminant function analysis
might be seen In a sense as more economical In the attempt
to Identify Important correlates of I-level. as the technique
may "pull out" the most critical variables and thereby pro-
vide a more compact or parsimonious account of variance due,
for example, to verbal I.Q. or cognitive complexity.
The statistical significance of the separation between
groups achieved by the discriminant may be tested by
calculating a value "V," based on the eigenvalue of the
discriminant, the number of groups, and the number of
variables; V is then referred to a chl-square table
(Anderson, I966). The formula for V is:
V = - (N - ) logg JN.
with N = total nmber of Ss, t = number of variables, g =
number of groups, and A = 1+^ , X being the eigenvalue
(Anderson, I966)
.
Table 13 presents the two discriminant functions
derived for the ten major dependent variables in this study
(again excluding delay of gratification).
The first discriminant provides 79.60 per cent of the
total variance in this data analysis. The variable having
by far the largest vreight is instrument cognitive complexity.
The degrees of freedom appropriate to the statistic "V" for
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Table I3
DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION ANALYSIS OF
DEPENDEI-IT MEASURES
Variable
1. Verbal I.Q. (v/isc)
,03
2. Performance I.Q. (vjisc)
.02
3. Locus of Control « 04(Rotter I-E Scale)
^. Internalized Guilt
.01(Mosher Guilt Scale)
5. Cognitive Complexity
,98(Hunt CC Measure)
6. Foresight (Porteus TQ)
.01
7. Impulse Control (Porteus Q) -.02
8. Rated Locus of Control
-.12
(Behavioral I-E Rating)
9. Rated Internalized Guilt
-.08
(Behavioral IG xiating)
0. Rated Cognitive Complexity .10
(Behavioral CC Rating)
Eigenvalue 1.0
3
Proportion of Variance
Accounted for 79.60
.02
-.01
.00
.00
-.90
.00
-.06
-.33
.02
-.26
0.26
20 AO
Plrst Second
Discriminant Discriminant
F
df
P
8.15
20, 272
.001
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the first discriminant, calculated from the above mentioned
parameters, are (t + g - 2). where t = the number of
variables and g = the number of groups. For the seond
discriminant df = (t + g - i^,) (Anderson, I966)
.
For the first discriminant, V = 92.35. df = 11. which
is significajit at the .001 level (p < .001).
The second discriminant provides 20.^0 per cent of
the total variance in this analysis. The largest weight is
again on the instrument variable of cognitive complexity,
with rated locus of control and rated cogTiitive complexity
carrying the next highest weights. For the second
discriminant, V = 30.62, df = 9. which is also significant
at the .001 level (p < .001).
There is little question from this analysis that Hunt's
measure of cognitive complexity is the best single predictor
of I-level classification among the variables investigated
in this study. It was noted above that two variables could
each show significant discrimination when each was considered
separately by analysis of variance, and yet possibly only
one would have a discriminant weight of notable size. The
present analysis illustrates and supports this contention
of the usefulness of discriminant function analysis as a
statistical technique for the present type of research
effort.
One further point which this analysis makes is that, in
a very real sense, the implied ordinal relationships betv/een
stages of I-level theory, i.e., that Level 2 < Level 3 <
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Level k, is validated by the discriminant function. This is
seen because the discriminant which best separates the three
I-level groups also indicates that the groups occur along
its linear axis in the same ordering as is posited by I-level
theory. This particular ordering did not have to occur in
the analysis. It appears from this that an implicit
validity of the ordering of the levels has been demonstrated.
r-lultiple Regres sion Ana.lysis
. As noted, for the
limiting case of two groups, discriminant function analysis
and multiple regression analysis are virtually Identical,
i.e., the pooled regression analysis for two groups can be
looked at as the same as a discriminant function analysis
for those groups. Multiple regression is concerned with
the ability to predict from several variables considered
simultaneously. It also illustrates the form of the rela-
tionship which occurs, and specifically, whether this
relationship can be approximated well by a linear function
(Hays, 1963). In a problem in regression, one variable is
clearly the independent or predictor variable, the variable
manipulated or knoxvn first by the experimenter. This
variable X is represented at several arbitrary values in
the experiment. The only Interest here is in the possibility
and degree of linear prediction of Y from X.
If X is the score on a criterion variable and Yi, Y2 . .
are predictor variables, then X is treated as a vj^eighted
sum of predictor variables, as in
Xi = wi Yi + ;.;2 Y2 + . . . ivjj, Y^.
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In the Simplest case there may be only one predictor and
one criterion variate. The general solution or model makes
no restriction on the kind of measures used. They may be
discrete, continuous, or dichotomous for either type of
variable. In general, for this model the unit and origin
of both sets of variables is irrelevant (Horst, I966)
.
The discriminant function analysis performed above
was useful in obtaining information as to the best discrim-
inant for three I-level groups. The possibility remained,
however, that for any two I-level groups the predictor or
discriminant may not be the same as for all three groups
considered together. In order to test this possibility,
multiple regression analyses were performed for I-level
groups 2 and 3 together, groups 3 and ^ together, and
groups 2 and ^ together. The results of these analyses
are presented in summary form in Table 1^.
The F-ratio for multiple regression analyses is
calculated from the formula:
F = ...H^ (N-D-1)
P (1-^2)
2
where R = the squared multiple correlations between the
criterion and predictor values, p = the number of predictors,
and N = the total number of subjects (adapted from ilnderson,
1966).
From the table it is seen that essentially four
predictors are discriminating differentially for the three
I-level groupings. For discriminating between Levels 2 and
3, cognitive complexity as measured by Hunt's test remains
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Table Ik
OF ANALYSES OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION OF
ELEVEl^ DEPENDENT VARIABLES ON I
-LEVEL
CLASSIFICATION FOR THREE SETS OF GROUPS
Variable
I-
-j-.evei Groups
T O 1-3 1-2•L ™ fc^
and and and.
T T 1-4 1-4
1. Verbal I.Q. (-./isc)
.03
.34
.19
2. Performance I.Q. (v/iSC)
. Co
.09
.27
3. Locus of Control (Rotter)
—
. Lc.
-.02
.00
^. Internalized Guilt (Mosher^ 1 Q
.01 .00
5. Cognitive ComDlexity (Hunt)
• C ( .11
.07
6. Foresight (Porteus TQ)
-.06
.08 .14
7. Impulse Control (Porteus Q) -.17
-.04
-.12
8. Rated Locus of Control
-.23
-.01
-.20
9. Rated Internalized Guilt
.02
-.03 .00
10. Rated Cognitive Complexity
.01
.27 .10
11. Rated Liking (Preference)
-.09
-.08
-.09
Multiple Correlation
.61 .62
.75
Standard Error of Estimate
for Standard Scores
.80 .78 .67
F 3.04 6.36 8.11
df 11. 58 11, 111 11. 71
P
.01 .001 .001
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a crucial variable, however the wISC performance measure
is an equally good predictor for these two groups (i.e.,
contributes a similar amo-ont of unique variance). Thele
two measures used in combination would apparently be highly
effective in separating Level 2 and Level 3 youths. The
best predictive variable for separation of Levels 3 and
however, is clearly verbal intelligence, as measured by the
1/ISC. It is Of interest to note that the rating variable of
cognitive complexity is also sho.m effective in distinguishing
between these two groups. For Levels 2 and 4, the best
discriminant is again the variable of non-verbal or
performance Intelligence.
A caveat is in order here regarding the interpretation
of regression equations. The beta weights of regression
equations are notably difficult to Interpret, a situation
which is partly due to sampling limitations. It is knom,
for instance, that because of sampling phenomena, beta
weights frequently lack stability in replication (Hays,
1963), a regretable circumstance due to the distribution of
correlations in the population. This is particularly noted
when the predictor variables are substantially correlated
with one another, which is the case with these data.
With this in mind, the results of the regression analyses
cited will not be weighed too heavily. However, in light
of these results and their similarity to the apparent
covarlance noted previously of verbal Intelligence and
cognitive complexity, a further analysis was performed.
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The practicality of considering at some length the effects
due to cognitive complexity and verbal I.Q. (perhaps best
predictors, as noted above, for Levels 2 and 3, and Levels
3 and ^, respectively) is fairly obvious to I-level
diagnosticians. They have frequently shared the observa-
tion that the most difficult diagnoses (and therefore the
most errors) are made in attempting to distinguish between
Levels 3 and ^,
Comparative Analysis of Alternate Measures to I-Level
Classification ' — —
The question must be raised as to how distinct the
I-level classification system actually is from the constructs
of verbal intelligence and cognitive complexity, constructs
which are purportedly relatively insignificant in determin-
ing I-level classification (iJarren. 1972). This, too, is
a question of some practical relevance, since the I-level
diagnostic interview is a somewhat timely and costly
operation. It may vjell be expedient to find other, more
economical vrays of arriving at the same classifications.
Table 15 presents a listing of the intercorrelations
of the dependent variables with I-level classification,
cognitive complexity, and verbal intelligence. Table I6
presents a summary of the analyses of variance of the
dependent variables vath I-level, cognitive complexity,
and verbal intelligence, each treated separately as inde-
pendent variables. Since the correlation coefficients
included some scores whose confornance to parametric
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Table I5
TABLE OF INTERCORRELATIOMS OF I-LSVEL. COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY,
vase VERBAL I.Q. MiD THE DEPENDMT VARIABLES
Hunt Verbal
Instruments IzLevel __CC_ WISG ,
Verbal I.Q. ( /isC) .58^^*
.57*^,
Performance I. Q. (wiSC)
.53** .Z^l^^,> ^^1^.,,
Locus of Control (Rotter
-.15
.02 - 15I—E) * *
Jv^^J!''^^^??^
^^^^^
.02 .05(Kosher GS) ^
Cognitive Complexity
, 50** k^h^.
(Hunt CC) '-^^
Foresight (Porteus TQ)
.32«-* .19^^- ,i8*
Impulse Control (Porteus Q) -.37---^^ -.31*^^ -.23^^'--
Behavioral Measures
Locus of Control (Rated
_,4o** - 29^-^^ - 21^^
I-E)
Internalized Guilt (Rated ,28** .27** IQ*
IG) ^
Cognitive ComDlexity ,42** ,29** 29**
(Rated CC)
Delay of Gratification .15
.13 .12
(Feather)
Liking (Rated Preference)
.07 .14 .16*
Note.— * p < .05
** p < .01
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Table 16
SUMMRY OP AI.ALYSES OF VARIAI.CE OF DEPENDEI.T VARIABLES AS
FWICTION OF I-LEVEL, COGNITIVE COMPLEX'ITY.
MJD Wise VERBAL I.Q.
Hunt Verbal
Instruments 1-Level _cc_ WISC
Verbal I.Q. (lasc) 3^.53^^^^^ 32. 1?^^^*^^ -
Performance I.Q. (Viisc) 26.36*^^-^ I7.5I**-* 59.97-^-^^^^
Locus of Control (Rotter 1.68 0.6^ O.75
Internalized Guilt
,53 17^ 0 Pii(Mosher GS) ^ ^'^^ ^'^^
Cognitive Complexity 32 23^"fr-«-i5- oh co"^"-(Hunt CC) •^ 2^.83--^—
Foresight (Porteus TQ) 7.68*-* 6.31^-^^- 2.03
Impulse Control (Porteus Q) 11. 35^--** 13.5^^^'^^-* 3.09^-
Behavioral Measures
Locus of Control (Rated 11. 67*** 6.02*^ I.9I
I-E)
Internalized Guilt (Rated 7.10^* 3.86-'^ 5.83^^-2^
IG)
Cognitive Complexity I5.O8*** 5.62(Rated CC)
Delay of Gratification 2.33 0.81 O.03
(Feather)
Note. — •"- p < .05
p < .01
p < .005
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assimptlons is somewhat questionable, the reader will
probably want to place greater reliance on the
--values
reported, for which there Is no question of violated para-
metric assumptions.
In treatlns cosnitive complexity and verbal I.Q. as
independent variables for analysis with the dependent
variables, it was necessary to assign scores on these
measures to three groups which approximated the original
distribution of subjects within I-level groups. Scores
on the H-unt CC measured rajiged from 0.00 to 2.00 and were
cut off at tx7o points in the distribution which approximated
as closely as possible the breakdox«7n in the I-level dis-
tribution (1-2 = 15; 1-3 = 55; 1-4 = 68). This breakdo.m
yielded a distribution for three groups with Ns of 20, 65,
and 53 (low. middle, and high CC, respectively). Verbal
intelligence groupings were dram from the extremes of the
verbal I.Q. scores in direct proportion to the I-level
distribution. Thus, the lowest 15 scores were considered
to be a grouping of low verbal Intelligence, the highest
68 scores were labeled the high intelligence group, and the
remaining 55 scores, a middle intelligence grouping.
From Table 15 it is apparent that the intercorrelations
among the different variables are quite similar, and from
Table I6 it is shoxm that there is not a sizeable degree
of difference in the ability of I-level, cognitive com-
plexity as measured by Hunt's test, and the Verbal ,^'ISC
to separate groups on the dependent variables listed. As
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might be expected from the results of the discriminant
function analysis, the measure of cognitive complexity
reaches significance on all the variables with which I-level
was sigTiificant, while verbal I.o. obtains significance on
all but two of the variables.
../hile, as expected, the
F-values for I-level are generally somewhat higher,
cognitive complexity does equally as well as I-level
classification for separating groups on the variables
of foresight and impulse control, while verbal I.Q. does
as well for instrument cognitive complexity and the
behavioral measures of internalized guilt and cognitive
complexity. It would appear from these data that perhaps
a feasible alternative to the time-consuming process of
the I-level interview, would be to use Hunt's measure of
CC in combination with a measure of verbal intelligence
for obtaining I-level classifications.
Test of the Devil's Advocate Hypothesis
The Devil's Advocate hypothesis stated that when
system-atic group differences in intelligence are controlled,
all other differences
-predicted between I-level groups
disappear
.
Prom the results of the previous analyses, and
specifically the strong effect shovm due to both verbal
intelligence and cognitive complexity on I-level classifi-
cation, the test of this hypothesis vrould seem to be an
essential one as a final test of the construct validity
of I-level theory.
There is an additional reason for partialing out the
effects due to intelligence. An obvious reservation about
the Instruments selected for measuring locus of control,
internalized guilt, cognitive complexity, foresight, and
impulse control is that they are all paper-and- pencil
devices. They are to be considered as validity criteria
for the interpersonal maturity construct, yet I-level is
measured by intensive clinical interview. In one sense,
then, the written instruments constitute stringent tests
of validity because they are based on quite different
assessment procedures. On the other hand, as noted above,
the Devil's Advocate hypothesis articulates the view that
I-level classification may reflect primarily intelligence,
which is well known to correlate highly with scores on
many written instruments. In this sense the written
validity criteria might be contaminated—and thus too
lenient— through the mediation of intelligence.
Table 1? presents four sets of data: first, the
original correlations between I-level and each of the
dependent variables; second., a presentation of the results
of a covariance analysis of the dependent variables against
I-level with verbal intelligence partlaled out; third, the
results of partialing out both verbal and non-verbal
Intelligence together; and fourth, the results when the
effects due to verbal intelligence, non-verbal intelligence,
and cognitive complexity are all partlaled out together.
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It is now time to lay the Devil to rest. The data
presented in Table 1? clearly indicate that when the
effects of both verbal and non-verbal intelligence are
removed from the dependent variables, there still remains
a Significant relationship of the instrument measured
constructs of cognitive complexity, foresight, and impulse
control, as well as each of the three constructs measured
by behavioral ratings (although these are more difficult
to interpret) to I-level classification. The same results
are true when Hunt's measure of cognitive complexity is
also removed. A discussion of the implications of the
findings presented in this chapter follows immediately below
Chapter VI
DISCUSSION
Due to the relative clarity of the results as described
in the previous chapter, this discussion will be primarily
directed toward briefly summarizing the results of the
analyses and then considering some implications of these
findings for I-level theory and classification.
I-level was unequivocally validated in respect to the
constructs of cog-nitive complexity, impulse control, and
foresight. There was a slight trend for delay of gratifi-
cation to be significantly related to I-level classification;
however, due to the inadequate number of subjects in one of
the groups tested on this measure, these results cannot be
assigned too much importance. On the other hand, both locus
of control ( internal- external orientation) and internalized
guilt did not show a significant relationship to I-level,
and thus I-level theory was not validated in respect to
these constructs.
At the same time that I-level was validated for the
constructs of cognitive complexity. Impulse control, and
foresight, a highly significant positive relationship was
demonstrated between verbal and non-verbal (performance)
intelligence and I-level classification. In addition,
further analyses indicated that of all the variables
Investigated, cognitive complexity x^as the best single
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predictor or discriminator of I-level classification.
However, even when the effects due to intelligence and
cognitive complexity were removed from the data, the con-
structs validated continued to maintain their statistically
significant relationships to I-level diagTiosis. m general,
it would seem reasonable to claim that the present results
have validated I-level theory for certain constructs
reputedly central in its formulation, have not validated
it for certain other constructs, and that there evidently
is more to I-level than caji be explained by Intelligence
and/or cognitive complexity. Having made this statement,
however, it must be conceded that all of the measures in
this study which clearly validated the theory are tasks
that correlate with Intelligence to a considerable extent
(Porteus Mazes and sentence completions).
A related study recently brought to the attention of
the author, should be noted here. Cross and Tracy (1971)
investigated the hypotheses that as interpersonal maturity
Increases 1) Internal control will become stronger. 2) time
perspective will be projected further into the future (this
is related to delay of gratification and foresight) , and
3) guilt will increase. The measures used to test these
three hypotheses were, respectively, the reverse form of
the Children's Locus of Control Scale (Blaler. I96I) , the
Future Events Test (Stein. Sarbln. and Kulik. I968) , and
the riosher Guilt Scale in combination with an eight-question
transgression interview, which was tape-recorded and later
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analyzed by a content analysis and a global clinical rating.
Their results substantiated hypothesis one. but did not
support hypotheses two and three, similar to the present
study, then. Cross and Tracy also did not find a significant
relationship of l-level and Internalized guilt; unlike the
present results, however, and using a different measure,
they did show a significant relationship between locus of
control and I-level (F = 3.^8. df = 1, 113. p<.05). it is
difficult to explain this difference In the statistical
significance of the results of the two studies and perhaps
additional research, utilizing both of these measures of
locus of control, should be conducted. Indeed, since one
of the ma.lor diagnostic indicants In the I-level interview
for separating Level 3 and Level L^r is the judged presence
or absence of internalized controls or standards, some further
Investigation of this construct seems appropriate. This is
true particularly since the guilt measure used in both
studies, which also should theoretically show differential
internalization, yielded results unequivocally not related
to I-level classification.
A few Informal observations regarding the results from
use of the Mosher Guilt Scale may be appropriate here. The
first Is an observation of the characteristic response styles
of one of the subtypes within Level 4. Labeled Neurotic-
Acting-out (NA) youths, a dominant characteristic of this
group (who comprise nearly half of the population of 1-4
juvenile offenders) is a tendency to deny categorically any
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feelings of inadequacy or inferiority. The feelings of
8ruilt, anxiety, and negative self-image are theoretically
present within the 1-4 NA, however, an admission of these
feelings will not readily be forthcoming. The subtypes
within I-level classification (unlike the theory of levels)
are said to be empirically derived, and if this character-
istic of the NA was indeed operating in the present study,
it might help explain the lack of increased internalized
guilt as I-level increased
.
A further comment is directed to the Kosher Guilt
Scale itself, llhile this Instrument has been used success-
fully with delinquent populations (e.g., Ruma and Kosher,
1967), a glance at some of the items included and the
scorings applied to various choices raises the question
as to the appropriateness of this measure for use with the
relatively sophisticated youthful offender of today's
society. As an example, for the stem "I regret ..."
the choices available are A. "my sexual experiences" or
B, "nothing I've ever done." Choice A is scored +2 and
Choice B is scored -2 (a high score indicates more internal
ized guilt) . For the stem "Women who curse ..." the
alternatives are A. "are normal" or B. "make me sick,"
A is scored -1; B, +2. "Sin and failure . . ." A. "are
the works of the Devil" or 3. "have not bothered me yet."
A is scored +2; B, -2. Admittedly, these examples are
extreme cases and m-any of the other items on Mosher's
scale are reasonable in content and scoring (see Appendix d
For future research on Internalized guilt with juvenile
Offenders, however, perhaps additional cr alternative
measures should be sought.
A final observation here relates to both the Mosher
Guilt and Rotter I-e scales as paper-and-pencil forced-
choice instruments. It was suggested earlier that the
notable lack of discriminant validity between these two
measures (r = .28. p < .01) may have been because they
share the same test format. This seemed a reasonable
speculation since the quite different instrument measure
of cognitive complexity (sentence completions) gave
evidence of excellent discriminant validity with both the
Kosher and Rotter tests (r = .02 in each case). The
inadequacies of paper-and-pencil instruments are well
documented and the researcher who uses them does so with
an awareness of the penalties which result from the
additional error variance Introduced into his design.
However, particularly when forced-choice tests are admin-
istered to groups, it is very easy for individual subjects,
responding from a myriad of possible motivations, to respond
randomly or carelessly to the questionnaire items. One of
these possible motivations has been colorfully coined by
Masling as the "screw you" effect, and the subjective
impressions of the experimenters and scorers of data in
the present study verified, the notion that certain juvenile
offenders may be particularly vrLlling to "screw" the
establishment-researcher-psychologist, who is perceived
.e
".es
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as imposing on their privacy and "messing with their minds."
Several of the subjects did in fact follow a strict "A, B,
A. B, etc." format throughout the questionnaires. whil<
others were not as obvious as this but the inconsistent,
in the content of their responses indicated a random selection
of the choices available.
The emphasis here is not to blame the subjects who
responded in this manner, but rather to point out the
perhaps obvious fact that the probabilities of this phenomenon
occuring are much less with instruments such as Hunt's
sentence completion test, and even less with measures such
as the individually administered Porteus Kazes. It is not
insignificant to observe that the only major variables in
this study which did not obtain significance with I-level
were those measured by the forced-choice instruments. This
may mean that the constructs of locus of control and
Internalized guilt are in fact not related to I-level as
the data indicate, or it may mean that the Instruments used
were not adequate (for the reasons noted above) for explor-
ing this relationship sufficiently. This problem is a
particularly difficult one for researchers of personality
since the problem is actually the historical question in
psychology of how to measure intei*nal constructs. The
behavioral ratings used in this study were part of an
attempt to measure the youths* internalized guilt and
internal-external orientation in ways other than vjith the
forced-choice instruments, yet the problems in Interpreting
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the ratings were seen clearly in the previous chapter. An
immediate solution to this dilemna. of course, is not
available; however, it is suggested that future researchers
of the I-level construct search for other available measures
of internalization, or develop and validate new ones, which
would not be so susceptible to the extraneous influences
discussed here, and which would therefore allow for a more
definitive, more defendable test of the theory.
Discussion for the remainder of this paper will be
directed toward considering some implications of the
present findings for I-level theory as representative of
the cognitive-developmental model, the relationship of
Intelligence and cog-nitive complexity to I-level theory,
some practical implications of utilizing alternative
measures of I-level classification, as well as suggested
directions for future research in this area.
Some Implications for I-Level Theory as an Example of the
Cognitive-Developmental Approach to b'ocialization
In Chapter II a description was presented of the
assumptions common to cognitive-developmental theories
(of which I-level was shown to be representative). One of
the general characteristics of cognitive stages was reported
to be the existence of an invariant order or sequence in
Individual development. It was said, for example, that
cultural and environmental factors or innate potentialities
might cause any child or group of children to reach a
given level of development at a much earlier point in time
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tha^ another child or group; but that regardless of environ-
mental teaching or lack of teaching, all children should
still pass through the same order of steps or levels of
development, stage notions are essentially ideal constructs
designed, to represent differing psychological organizations
at various points in development. According to Kohlberg
(1969b), the stage doctrine hypothesizes that these
qualitatively different types of organization are sequentially
invariant, and therefore that the developmental status of an
individual is predictable or cumulative in the same sense
as continuity of position on an ordinal scale.
I-level theory, as previously described, postulates
seven successive stages of interpersonal maturity. By
definition within the cognitive-developmental model, the
stages are said to be invariantly ordered. To this writer's
knowledge, however, ajid unlike the demonstrated empirical
invariance of Kohlberg 's stages of moral development for
example, there has been no prior experimental confirmation
of the presumed ordering of the levels of interpersonal
maturity. In the previous section it was seen that the
results of the discriminant function and multiple regression
analyses substantiated the postulated orderings of the
stages of I-level theory, at least for Levels 2, 3, and ^.
The predictor variables which were found to best separate
these I-level groups also arranged themselves along a linear
axis in the same ordering as is presumed by the theory.
While determining the nature of this sequence was not part
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of the original design of this experiment, the results do
indicate an additional aspect of validation for the theory,
as well as lend increased support for the tenet of
invariant sequence embodied in the concept of cognitive
stages.
In addition to these implications, it was also noted
in Chapter II that cognitive-d evelopmental theorists explain
basic development in terms of parameters of organizational
wholes or systems of internal relations, and thus when
describing social-emotional development emphasize the
existence of a fundamental unity of personality organiza-
tion and development knoim as the ego, or self, while there
are various aspects of social development (moral development,
intellectual development, psychosexual development, etc.),
these aspects are said to be united by their common
reference to a single concept of self in a single social
x-jorld. In other words, these theorists claim (see
especially Loevinger, I966) that in addition to the unity
of level of social development due to general cognitive
development, there is a further unity of development due
to a common factor of ego maturity.
Loevinger rather adamantly prefers to reserve the term
ego development for only "what is common to a certain
developmental sequence and a certain characterology that
applies almost independently of age level. V/hat is common
to the developmental sequence and the characterology is an
abstraction. To this abstraction and only to this is the
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term ego development most appropriately applied (Loevln.er.
1966. p. 196)..' ,he admits that her sug;,estion to a.ply
the term ego development to an abstraction rather than to
the concrete stages of growth observable In average
Children may seem strange at first, but counters that this
is true in the accepted concept of mental age. Because
all aspects of growth are occuring simultaneously she
argues, some criterion other than the normal sequence is
needed to distinguish physical growth from intellectual,
or intellectual from moral, and so on. Further, what has
not been captured fully in any exposition Is that the
diverse manifestations of aspects at each stage of develop,
ment at once constitute a simple organic unity and develop
through organically related steps. In other words, all
these manifestations are part of a single thing— a pervasive
thing that cannot reasonably be called less theji ego develop-
ment. i.'/hat the organizing principle Is remains to be
clarified
.
Loevinger's approach is presented here In an attempt
to understand or at least conceptualize the results of the
present study which indicated there is more to I-level
theory than can be explained by either intelligence or
cognitive complexity. Her oim formulation of the stages of
ego development draws heavily from the work of Sullivan,
Grant, and Grant (whom she acknowledges have been concerned
with the abstract junction of a developmental sequence and
a character typology)
, and is markedly similar to I-level
theory.
Loevlnger specifies for each of her seven stages the
characteristic mode of impulse control and character
development, of interpersonal relations, and of conscious
preoccupation, including self-concept. However, she makes
what she considers a crucial distinction for measurement
in Viewing ego development as having two quite different
types of manifestations—milestone sequences and polar
aspects. Her stages are all characterized in terms of
milestone sequences which are defined as observable
behaviors that tend to rise and then fall off in prominence
as maturity increases. As an example, she cites conformity
to generally accepted social standards, which becomes
Increasingly characteristic of behavior up to a point,
but beyond that point with increasing maturity becomes
progressively less compelling, though not necessarily
turning into nonconformity. On the other hand, an example
of a polar aspect is tendency to stereotypy; it constantly
and monotonically decreases with increasing ego level.
Polar aspects are generally more abstract traits and are
harder to judge than milestone sequences, since they must
be inferred from patterns of observable behavior. For
Loevinger, polar variables hold the key to uncovering the
unity due to ego development, while milestones are simply
variables along the way to some more comprehensive trait.
She would most likely Interpret the results of the present
study by saying "I told you so," meaning that most of the
variables investigated were merely manifestations of milestone
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sequences, that the " unexplainable" remaining significant
correlations after intelligence and cognitive complexity
were removed reflected unobservable polar aspects, and
might conclude with the warning that an approach to person-
ality study that is at once behavioristic and quantitative
cannot possibly discover or reconstruct the variables
central to development. Ker comments on the use of factor
analysis, as related to this last point, are presented in
Appendix M.
Loevinger»s beliefs about the nature of ego develop,
ment and the proper study of this area of investigation,
while considered rather extreme and untenable by some
critics, deserve consideration. There is certainly nothing
m her exposition which is incompatible with the assumptions
adhered to by the cognitive-developmental theorists. In
any case, it seems worthwhile to consider her "interpreta-
tion" of the results of the present study as a thought-
provoking, if not a reasonable, explanation. An alternative,
though related, hypothesis to Loevinger's is offered in the
following discussion of intelligence, cognitive complexity,
and I- level.
Intelligence, Cognitive ComTPlexity. and I-Level
In the hypotheses presented in Chapter III, a significant
positive relationship was predicted between intelligence and
I-level, as well as between cognitive complexity and I-level.
Several studies reviewed (see especially Zaidel, 1970) had
shown strong relationships between I-level and intelligence.
While the content of the theory itself was sho.^ to Indicate
fairly clearly that a significant relationship of each of
these two variables to I-level should not be surprising.
What is surprising, then, is not that these predicted rela-
tionships were confirmed, or even that this confirmation was
so unequivocal, but rather that for years the founders and
developers of I-level, publicly at least, have minimized
the effects of intelligence and cognitive complexity on I-
level. preferring rather to emphasize the personality
variables and interpersonal aspects of the theory.
In reality, it is not quite so easy to separate
intelligence from personality variables or social develop-
ment, although it is imderstand able that developers of a
new theory of personality development would wish to present
their formulation as something more than a restatement of
the intelligence or abilities llteratiAre. Apparently.
I-level does involve something more than intelligence, sjid
it would seem that some recognition of the crucial role
intelligence plays in the development of interpersonal
maturity would not detract from the attractiveness of the
theory as presented by its proponents.
The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization
makes the assumption that social development is cognitively
based since any description of shape or pattern of a
structure cf social responses necessarily entails some
cognitive dimensions. A description of the organization
of the child's social responses involves a description of
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the way in V7hich he perceives, or conceives, the social
world and the way in which he conceives himself. This
last sentence Is practically a verbatim statement of the
basic focus of I-level as presented In Chapter II, where
It was said that the theory "focuses upon the ways In
which the Individual is able to see himself and the world,
and the ways he is able to Interpret what is happening
betvreen himself and others." Af^aln, as a theory of inter-
personal maturity within the framework of the cognitive-
developmental approach, this similarity of focus of the
"t^wo models is certainly appropriate, at the same time as
it serves to underline the rationale for the results in
the present study which show not only a hi/7;h correlation
of level of coPTiitive complexity with I-level, but of the
variables included for study, that cognitive complexity
is the best single predictor of I-level classification.
Empirically, Kohlberg notes that the cognitive-
developmental approach is derived from the observation that
the most prominent and clear changes in the psychological
development of the child are co.gnitive, in the sense of
mental age or I,Q. Indeed it has been shovm that the
Influence of Intelligence on the social attitudes and
behavior of children is such that it has a greater number
of social-behavioral correlates than any other single
observed aspect of personality (Cattell, 1957). In terms
of prediction, the longitudinal study by Anderson mentioned
earlier, offers this summary:
106
^v. . t
surprised at the emergence ofthe intelligence factor in a variety of ourinstrument, (family attitudes, responsibility
and maturity, adjustment) in SDite'of ourattempts to minim.ize intelligence in selecting;our personality measures. Ilext ue were sur-prised that for prediction over a long time,the intelligence quotient seems to carry aheavy predictive load in most of our measures
of outcome. It should be noted that in a
number of studies, adjustment at both the
child and the adult level, whenever intelligence
IS included, emerges as a more significant factorthan personality measures (Anderson, i960, p. ^93).
It seems evident that the power of I.Q. to predict social
behavior comes from many sources, including the social and
school success experiences associated with "brightness."
However, apparently a large part of the predictive power
of I.Q. also derives from the fact that more rapid cogTiitive
development appears to be associated with more rapid social
development. This interpretation of I.Q. effects was
documented in an interesting study by Kohlberg and Zigler
(1967) of the sex-role attitudes of bright and average
boys and girls. Among other findings, their study indicated
that while there were marked and similar developmental
trends for both bright and average children, these trends
were found to be largely determined by mental as opposed to
chronological age, V/hen parallel curves of age-development
were plotted for both groups, the curves were found to be
approximately two years advanced for the bright children,
who were about two years ahead in mental age. For example,
the authors note that bright boys would shift from a pre-
ference for adult females to a preference for adult males
on experimental and doll-playing tests at about four years
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of age, whereas the averaP:e boys would make this shift at
about Six years. Kohlberg cites the findings of a similar
study in Which retarded and average lower-class boys were
divided into two groups: father-absent and father-present.
The average boys made the shift to the male at 5-6. and the
retarded boys at age 7-8. clearly these findings indicate
that sex-role developmental trends are mediated by intelli-
gence, and it seems feasible to presime that interpersonal
maturity development is similarly mediated by intelligence
or level of cognitive complexity.
Carrying this discussion of I-level and cognitive
complexity and intelligence into another area of comparison,
a major diagnostic indicant within the I-level interview
is the sophistication of youths in ability to perceptually
differentiate between people in their environment. Questions
such as "How is your Mother different from other mothers?"
and "What kind of people do you prefer as friends?" are
asked the interviewees in order to determine the extent to
which they differentiate what they see in their world.
VTlthin the cognitive-developmental model, constructs such
as "differentiation" are regarded as structural components
of development and as such are considered to characterize
every aspect of the personality: the social- emotional
.
the perceptual, and the intellectual. There is research
which indicates that differentiation is quite highly
correlated x-Jith standard psychometric measures of intelligence
as v^ell as with a variety of social attitudes and traits.
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Those readers familiar with the original presentation of the
theory of Harvey, Hunt, and Schroeder (I96I) will recognize
the similarity here to their view of personality as
increased structural d iff erentation and integration of
conceptions of self and others, which implies both cognitive
and attitudinal correlates.
It will be remembered from the description in Chapter
II, that the development of cognition and the development
of affect were said to be parallel. Clearly, this is not
to say that cognition determines affect and behavior, but
rather that the development of the two has a common struc-
tural base. It was pointed out, directly above, that a
structural dimension of development such as "differentiation"
Is considered to characterize every facet of the personality,
and that a sig-niflcant positive relationship has been found
both between differentiation and Intelligence, and differ-
entiation and social traits. If differentiation is a basic
structural component common to the development of both
intelligence (cognition) and social traits (affect), then
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest again, not that
I-level stages are cognitive, but rather that interpersonal
development also has a basic structural component. In other
words, in the same way in vrhlch the development of cognition
and affect were said to have a common structural base, so
it is suggested that the development of interpersonal
maturity (which has both co.gnitlve and affective aspects)
also has a basic underlying structural component (which may.
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or my not. be differentiation). While social- emotional
components are certainly involved in interpersonal develop,
ment, it is suggested that the development of these affects
is largely mediated by changes in thought patterns, or
cognitions.
Accepting this extrapolation for a moment, an implica-
tion of this position would be that an empirical correlation
should be expected between interpersonal maturity and
aspects of cognitive development which are not specifically
considered to be aspects of interpersonal maturity. The
correlations cited in the literature between I-level and
intelligence, rajiglng from .30 to
.59. indicate that inter-
personal maturity has a cognitive base, but is not simply
general verbal intelligence applied to social situations or
relationships. Perhaps another way, then, of explaining
the results discussed above from Loevinger's point of view,
is that what was left when the correlations in this study
were controlled for intelligence, was reflective of a
basic structural component, a base common to the develop-
ment of both cognition and interpersonal maturity. In fact,
It seems com.patible theoretically to assert that in
Loevinger»s belief (that the further unity of development
due to a common factor of ego maturity can only be meaning-
fully understood as an abstraction), her term' "abstraction"
is in actuality nothing more, or less, than the basic
cognitive-developmental notion of this common structural
component in social development. This component may be
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the orsanlzlns principle of ego development which Loevln.er
said was yet to be clarified. Whatever oommunallty, or
lack Of It. is involved here In these positions. It seems
relatively safe to say as an Interpretation of the present
results within this theoretical framework, that cognitive
complexity Is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition
for Interpersonal maturity.
Interpretlnp; the results of the present study as having-
shown construct validation for I-level theory, or at least
for certain aspects of the theory, leads to the question
of what was learned from the data regarding the classifica-
tion of youths within this system, and therefore to what
are the implications of these results for future I-level
classification.
From the analyses of the data it was seen that Hunt's
measure of cognitive complexity was a highly significant
predictor of I-level classification, accounting for 80 per
cent of the variance in the discriminant function analysis
of the dependent variables. A factor analysis of the variables
studied revealed that four fairly distinct, psychological
dimensions exerted the major Influence on I-level diagnosis.
These four factors were identified as general intelligence,
spatial-practical-mechanical intelligence, internalized
standards or values, and a factor of behavioral ratings.
(It might be noted here that v/hen the rater variables are
Ill
excluded from the factor analysis, a three-factor solution
is obtained which extracts the same first three factors
identified here, but x.ith higher loadings on the salient
variables and corresponding greater contributions to total
variance from the three factors tha^ in the solution
including the behavioral ratings.) it was also demon-
strated in several comparative analyses that using Kant's
measure in com.bination with a measure of verbal intelligence
would be an effective way of classifying youths for I-lev.^.I.
viith little, if any. corresponding loss of predictive power.
l-;hat becomes apparent when the results of these analyses
are considered together is the consistent manner in which
intelligence (both verbal and performance) ajid cognitive
complexity either covary with one another in accounting for
group differences, or alone are fairly powerful predictors
of I-level classification. In the discussion above some
theoretical and empirical evidence V7as offered to explain
why these strong relationships would occur. The inevitable
logical conclusion, however, is that a practical alternative
to the I-level diagnostic interview for procuring I-level
classifications, would be the use of perhaps a combination
of validated measures of verbal and performance intelligence
and cognitive complexity.
Considering what is involved in the I-level interview,
at first glance this conclusion would seem practically
irrefutable. A trained I-level diagnostician initially
sxiends an average of an hour-and -a-half in an intellectually
demanding interview situation in which the task is to
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determine the perceptual level and characteristic response
style (I-level and subtype) of the youth being classified.
The interview is tape-recorded and diagnosed by a second
trained rater who then shares his diagnostic impressions
With the interviewer, if disagreement exists in the two
diagnoses, the usual procedure is for both raters to re-
listen to the interview in an attempt to resolve their
differences. The diagnostic process itself for each youth,
then, requires at least three hours of trained staff time,
and may demand as much as six hours in some cases. As
might be expected, the training required to reach an
acceptable level of diagnostic accuracy or reliability
Is necessarily long and costly in staff time and energy.
Warren and her staff at the Center for Training in
Diff erential Treatment in Sacramento recommend an initial
intensive five-week training course in I-level theory,
diagnosis, and treatment, follov/ed by 30 to 50 additional
interviews as the minimal requirement for becoming a
proficient I-level diagnostician.
This description of what is involved in arriving at
an interview I-level diagnosis in combination with the
suggestion that equally discriminative diagnostic distinc-
tions could be derived, by group administration and simple
scoring of several measures of I.Q. and cognitive com-
plexity, provides a rather dramatic picture of the issues
involved here. Clearly the question becomes: VJhy would
anyone continue to use the former procedure when the
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latter has been satisfactorily demonstrated to classify
at least as well?
In the woriang draft of a paper on the advantages and
disadvantages of two current systems for classifying the
juvenile offender, presented to agencies within the
Colorado Division of fouth Services, the present writer
emphasized the point that
.-in deciding upon which measures
one wants to use In gathering data for diagnostic purposes,
it is first necessary to ask what kind of information is
needed for what specific reasons (Killer, I972, p. 16)."
The example was offered of the situation where an agency
staff makes the decision that they want to classify their
intake population in ways which will provide groupings for
the effective management of wards within an institutional
setting. It was noted that the amount and type of informa-
tion needed in this situation would probably be quite
different, for instance, from the information needed by
a different agency where it is decided to classify youths
into groups that would maximize the effectiveness of
intensive treatment, on a long-term basis, in the community.
This point is obviously relevant to the present
discussion, '.j'hile one common product of both the I-level
interview and the alternate much simpler, less costly
procedure suggested here vjould be the I-level diagnosis,
the amount and kind of information obtained in the process
of procuring the diagnosis would differ substantially for
each method. The alternate method would also provide
an intelligence quotient, an indicant of level of cognitive
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complexity, and perhaps some additional scores of mechanical-
spatial-practical abilities. In contrast, the I-level
interview, in the process of determining a diagnosis,
elicits a wide range of content within a large number of
areas related to each youth (e.g., family, peers, school,
reasons for delinquency, goals, self
-concept
.
etc.).
expressed in the youth's own idiosyncratic style and from
his own frame of reference. These differences between the
two diagnostic methods regarding the end-products obtained
are certainly not necessarily good or bad in and of them-
selves. Rather, again, the point for emphasis is that the
method chosen should directly reflect the determination of
what data are needed to optimize the probabilities for
meeting the specified goal(s) of a specified program in
the most efficient v/ay possible.
Some additional practical considerations inherent in
this choice of methods would necessarily involve questions
of staff availability and limitations, as x^ell as size of
intake load (i.e., is it necessary for us to be able to
classify groups of youths at one time, or is it possible
and feasible for us to do individual evaluations? ; how much
time (actual hours) can we devote to procuring a diagnosis
for each individual?; how much time and money can we
afford for training, etc.?).
It is the experience of the writer that most I-level
treatment agents would probably argue that they need the
additional and varied information elicited in the interviex*;
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m order to develop and Implement an Individualized trent-
-ent Plan for each youth, and that having only an 1-level
diagnosis and an Intellective-cognitive assessment would
not be sufficient. Thus, they probably would categorically
reject the sugsestion to utilize the alternative method
to Classification offered here. A rejection of the alterna-
tive method is certainly Justifiable if the decision to do
30 is rigorously assessed within similar guidelines as
those noted ir^ed lately above. However, having developed
individualized treatment plans based on Infomatlon obtained
from the I-level interview, and then working with Juvenile
offenders within the I-level treatment model, the present
writer seriously doubts that this argument for not using
the alternate method of diagnosis could be empirically
substantiated. This is not to say that the I-level treat-
ment model is invalid or ineffective for working with
youth offenders. Rather, it is suggested that the additional
information gained from the interview probably contributes
nonsignificantly to successful treatment outcome with
these youths, and that whatever treatment gains were
identified would be shown to be a factor of the differential
treatment strategies developed from knowledge of the I-level
diagnosis alone. Of course another possibility Is that
when the data from definitive I-level treatment outcome
studies are in, the Devil will rise from his resting place
and smile with the knowledge that Intelligence effectively
explains the differential results.
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In statlnp; above that the present results had validated
I-level theory for certain constructs and not for certain
others central to its formulation, a qualifier was added
Which noted that all of the measures used which clearly
validated the theory also correlate fairly highly with
mtelli.c^ence. Similarly, all of the strictly non-intellectual
behavioral tests used were shorn to be mostly unproductive
for additional validation of the theory. It is su;.gested
,
then, that further research in this area should strive for
operations to test the validity of I-level that are less
correlated with or mediated by intelligence. Such an
effort would provide a more definitive test of the theory,
and would consequently allow for more definitive statements
regarding its validity.
In addition. I-level theory is said by its proponents
to be a theory of personality development in general, with
applications for delinquency. In other words, the levels
within I-level theory putatively pertain to the entire
normal population, while the subtypes within the levels
have been derived from observations of the population of
juvenile offenders. In a certain sense, then, it could
be said that the present study has not satisfactorily
demonstrated the validity of this theory, since the
population sampled represents a relatively specific and
limited sub-gTouping of the total population which the
theory purports to describe. A crucial next step in the
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validation Of I-level theory, therefore, would be either
to replicate the present study or design a somewhat similar
one to InTestlsate the validity of I-level with a non-
delinquent adolescent population. To this point. l-level
research has been performed exclusively with juvenile
Offenders and no evidence of its supposed relevance to the
normal population has been demonstrated.
Chapter VII
SUI4MAiiY
The Interpersonal Maturity Level (I-level) Classlflca-
tlon System has been in use for a number of years to
classify juvenile offenders for the purpose of differential
treatment, while predictive research had been conducted
for assessing- the effectiveness of the differential
treatment strategies applied as a result of I-level
classification, little effort had been directed toward
validating the actual theory underlying the classifications.
The present study, then, was designed and carried out to
Investigate the construct validity of I-level theory.
Six measurable constructs were determined to be
among those central to the theory: cognitive complexity,
internal- external locus of control, internalization of
standards or values (internalized guilt), delay of grati-
fication, impulse control, and foresight or the ability
to plan behavior. A total of 138 subjects obtained from
three correctional settings were divided into groups on
the basis of their I-level classification, yielding the
following three groups: 15 youths diagnosed as functioning
at Level 2 (1-2), 55 youths at Level 3 (1-3). and 68 at
Level 4 (I-^). These subject groups were used in the
majority of analyses xvhlch tested the follov;ing hypotheses:
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Youths at higher levels of interpersonal maturity:
1) are more internally oriented in relation to control of
their lives, i.e., they are more inclined to interpret
important reinforcements as consequences of their oim
behavior rather than due to extrinsic factors in the
envi ronment
;
2) are more cognitively complex than those at lower levels
of development;
3) have internalized their om standards and values and
therefore experience greater internalized guilt than youths
at lovjer levels;
^) have greater impulse control than youths at lower levels
of development;
5) are more able to delay gratification than youths at
lower levels;
6) possess greater ability to exercise foresight and plan
behavior; in addition,
7) there is a significant positive relationship between
I-level diagnosis and verbal intelligence;
8) there is a significant positive relationship between
I-level diagnosis and non-verbal intelligence;
9) Devil's Advocate HyTPothesis : '..'hen systematic group
differences in Intelligence are controlled by matching or
statistical procedures, all of the differences predicted
in the first six hypotheses disappear.
Analyses of variance x-jere used to initially test
these eight principal hypotheses. The results confirmed
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that youths at higher levels of Interpersonal maturity are
more cognitively complex (as measured by Hunt's Paragraph
completion Kethod ) , have greater impulse control (as
measured by the Porteus Mazes Q Score), and possess greater
ability to exercise foresight and plan behavior (as measured
by the Porteus Mazes TQ Score). At the same time, a
highly significant positive relationship was found to
exist between I-level and both verbal and non-verbal
(performance) I.Q. (as measured by the iJISC)
.
On the other hand, the hypotheses x^re not confirmed
that youths at higher levels of interpersonal maturity
are more internally oriented in relation to control of
their lives (as measured by the Potter I-E Scale), or that
they experience greater internalized guilt (as measured by
the Nosher Guilt Scale). Delay of gratification (as
measured by Feather's Choice-of-Prizes Test) showed a
slight tendency to be related to I-level, hovjever, the
small number of subjects available on this measure in one
of the groups (1-2), made it difficult to consider these
results as additional validation for I-level theory.
Alternate measures of cognitive complexity, locus of
control, and internalized g-uilt used in the study xjere
behavioral ratings of these constructs obtained from house-
parents, cottage counselors, and caseworkers who were
familiar x-jith the youths Included for study. Analyses
of variance of these ratings shox-red highly significant
relationships betx'7een all three of these constructs and
I-level classification, however, multitralt-nultimethod
matrix analysis pointed to the extremely low discriminant
validity of the behavioral ratings. Subsequent analyses
were performed to remove the effects due to the raters'
preference or personal liking for the youths, as well as
the effects due to intelligence and level of cognitive
complexity, in order to assert the basis for the rater
Judgments and their lack of discriminant validity. From
these ajialyses it was concluded that the rating data
supported the validity of I-level theory in a general way
because the correlations were not artifactual, but hardly
indicated much specific validity for the constructs under
consideration.
In the test of the Devil's Advocate hypothesis,
differences across groups in intelligence were removed
from the data, with the result that each of the relation-
ships between cognitive complexity, im^pulse control, and
foresight and I-level continued to be significant. Thus,
this hypothesis x<ras not confirmed. It is necessary to
point out, however, that all of the measures in this study
that validated I-level theory (Hunt's sentence completion
test, Porteus mazes Q and TQ scores) substantially reflect
intelligence, which leads to an emphasis of the cognitive
aspects of I-level classification, as contrasted with the
interpersonal and characterological aspects featured by the
system's architects.
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A discriminant function analysis of the data Indicated
that Of all the variables included for study, hunt's measure
Of cognitive complexity was the best single predictor of
I-level classification, accountins for 80 per cent of the
total variance. ?actor analysis of the data revealed four
m:aJor factors operating within I-level classification in this
study: general intelligence, spatial-practical-mechanical
intelligence, internalized standards or values, and a
factor of behavioral ratings. Comparative analyses indicated
that using a combination of measures of intelligence and
cog-nitive complexity woiild provide a more parsimonious
and equally powerful predictor of I-level classification
as the standard I-level diagnostic interview.
These results were discussed in terms of the measures
used (particularly emphasizing the difficulties with forced-
choice Instruments in m.easuring Internal constructs)
, some
implications for I-level theory as an example of the cognitive-
developmental approach to socialization (suggesting that
cognitive complexity is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for interpersonal maturity development)
, and some
practical implications for the use of alternate measures to
I-level classification, noting that what method of diagnosis
is used depends largely on the amount and kind of information
needed to optimize the probabilities for meeting the specified
goal(s) of a specified program. Suggested directions for
further research included searching for operations to test
the validity of I-level which are not correlated with or
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mediated by intelligence, and also the necessity for design-
ing and performing studies to investigate the validty of
I-level theory with a non-delinquent adolescent population.
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Integration-Level Interview Schedule
131
132
INTEGHATION-LEVEL INTBRVIEW SCHEDULE
I. Expectation of i.
Youth Authority
2.
3.
4.
5.
II. Attitudes toward 1.
offense and
detention 2.
3.
k.
5.
III. Family (Parents, 1,
siblings, wife,
etc.) 2.
3.
4.
IV. Attitudes toward 1.
father (or sub-
stitute)
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
rthat do you think it's going
to be like in the Youth"
Authority?
what have you heard about it?
How do you feel about being
sent here?
VJhat do you think they are
trying to do to (for) you?
What should they be trying to
How did you happen to get in
trouble?
What kind of boys (girls) do
you like to be around in here?
Why?
What kind do you stay away
from? Why?
What staff people do you like
to be around? Why?
What staff people do you avoid?
Why?
How do your folks feel about
your trouble?
How do you feel about their
reactions?
Do they hold it against you?
Do you want them to visit you?
Will they?
'•/hat kind of man is your father?
What is he like? How did you
feel about him when you were
growing up? How do others feel
about him?
What do you admire most in your
father?
What do you dislike the most?
(Cr like least?)
How do you feel about his
discipline?
What do you figure makes him
tick?
Do you think you take after him?
How are you different from him?
Are you Incluenced by him in
any way? Why?
Who do you take after in your
family?
What are his ideals? What does
he believe in?
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Attitudes toward i,
mother (or sub-
stitute) 2
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Handling problem 1.
and affectivity
(V/henever you get
strong feelings 3.from the subject
in any area, ask
him how he thinks
other people feel
about it.) 5,
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
.-.'hat kind of a woman is your
mother? What's she like?
.-/hat do you admire most inyour mother?
What do you dislike most?(Or like least?)
How do you feel about her
discipline?
What do you figure makes her
tick?
Do you think you take after
her? Or are you influenced by
ner in any way? why?
What are her ideals? what
does she believe in?
Has your attitude toward
either parent changed in any
way? How?
Are you the sort of person
who gets strong feelings about
things or would you say you are
more easy-going?
What happens when you have
strong feelings ?
How about when you really get
Q^-?Ty at someone? (Do you
hold a grudge?)
What do you do when you really
feel blue or down in the dumps?
What usually makes you feel
that way?
Have you ever been really happy ?
What made you feel that way?
How do you express it?
Do you remember the time you
were the most frightened?
Are there things that still
frighten you as an adult?
What do you usually do when you
get into a tight spot?
What happens when you get real
upset?
How do you go about getting people
to do things for you?
Do you drink? How much? How
often?
How do you act when you've had
a lot to drink?
'What do you get out of drinking?
Do you see the drinking as a
problem to yourself? To others?
What do you consider your strong
points? (Pressure)
13^
19.
20.
VII. Self 1,
VIII. Work and /or 1.
school and
f ut ure
2.
3.
(Try to establish
reality of plans.) 4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
IX. Friends and 1,
others
2.
3.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
What are the things about your-
self that you don't like?
(Pressure)
What do you usually do about
them?
What kind of person are you?
Describe yourself as a third
person would
.
Are you the type that like to
plan for the future or take
things as they come? V/hy?
How do you feel about going to
school? Why?
What do you like about school
(most, least)?
What kind of teachers are best?
Worst?
What do you want to be when you
are grown?
How can you make this possible?
What kinds of work have you
done?
Did you like it? Why? Why not?
Would you rather work or go to
school?
How important do you think
friends are? Why?
What sort of people do you
prefer as friends? Why?
How do you go about choosing
a friend?
When you meet somebody for the
first time, what things about
him would make you want him for
a friend?
what kind of people do you find
objectionable? Why?
When you meet a person, what
things would make you dislike him?
Are there lots of people you
dislike?
Do you have a large or small
group of friends?
Do you have any especially close
frl ends?
Are some of your friends closer
friends than others, or are they
all about the same? What makes
the difference whether a person
is a close friend or just an
average friend? Is it just a
matter of hov; long you have
known him?
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X. Girlfriends,
boyfriends,
dating
XI. Marriage
(Handle this
area especially
according to age
level.)
XII. Present mental
health
XIII. Maturity
(If he says he's
not mature, ask
in what ways he is.)
11.
12.
13.
1.
2.
3.
^.
5.
1.
2.
3.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.
Have you made any friends sinceyou«ve been here? (Location)
Do you think you will makefriends here?
What kind of people do you most
admire? wish to be like? Everhave a hero?
How about women (men)? How doyou feel about them*^
What kind 0^ girl (boy) do youlike most?
What kind of girl (boy) don't
you like?
How important do you feel dating
Is?
How will you feel about being
away from girls (boys) while you
are in Youth Authority?
How do you feel about marriage?(Your parents' marriage?)
How do your parents get along
with each other?
What about marriage for yourself?
How would you run a family?
What should a husband do for his
family?
What should a wife do for her
family?
Who should discipline the kids?
How about working wives?
Where have you gotten your ideas
about marriage?
What do you think is the most
Important in making a marriage
work?
How has your health been recently?
How do you sleep nights? Any
trouble getting to sleep?
Do you have any dreams or night-
mares?
Have you been nervous or upset
very much? Do you consider your-
self to be a nervous person?
V/hat do you consider to be a
mature adult, groim-up person?
How would you describe him?
How can you tell what a mature
person is like? (Get specific
behavioral details.)
How does a mature person get
that way?
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XIV. Interview
XV, Interviewer's
impression
(To be dictated
after subject's
departure)
5.
6.
7.
1.
2.
3.
^.
5.
6.
1.
2.
3.
Do you consider yourself
mature?
In what ways do you consider
yourself not mature? (Elaborate)
How important is it to be
mature?
liovi about change? I'/hy? Do
people ever really change
once they are adults? How
about you? (Get details.)
We've talked a great deal about
the way you feel about various
people and things. I wonder if
we could spend some time
discussing your feelings about
what we were doing, what did
you think as we were talking,-?
How did you feel? (Elaborate)
Any questions make you feel
imcomfortable?
'do\t did you want the interview
to go?
what was the point of the inter-
view? i;/hat did we seem to be
after?
How did I seem to be feeling
during the time? Why v/as that?
How did he behave? (Elaborate
postural cues, amount of
psychomotor activity, tics,
mannerisms, restlessness, etc.)
How did the interviewer feel?
(Did he feel as though he were
pulling teeth, relaxed, v;arm
feelings, angry, comfortable,
uncomfortable, etc.)
What are your immediate impressions
of this person's "I" level? why?
Warren (I966)
APPENDIX B
Rating Scales of Youths' Internal-External F
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BATING SCALES OF YOUTHS
« INTERl^AL-EXTEHNAL FOCUS
1. This youth feels that no matter what he (she) does, it
won»t make any difference because powerful forces or
other people control his (her) life anyway.
H^t-it-^1 hardly somewhat extremely
2. This youth feels that there are any number of alternatives
available to him (her) in deciding the direction of his
(her) own life.
not at all hardly somewhat ^[Iliti extremely
3. This youth seems to feel that everything that happens to
him (her) is the result of luck, chance, or fate.
not at all hardly somewhat quite extremely
^. This youth behaves as if he (she) is completely at the
mercy of others around him (her).
not at all hardly somewhat quite extremely
APPENDIX C
fiatlng Scales of Youths' Cognitive Complexity
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1^0
RATING SCALES 0? YOUTHS' COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY
1. This youth would be able to understand me even if I
talked about some rather complicated areas.
""^^ ^ ^^^^ i^Si^miS ^iliti i5^tremely
2. This youth appears to be spontaneous and flexible in
his (her) approach to solving problems.
not at all hardly somewhat ^HTi extremely
3. This youth needs to have things spelled out for him (her)
over and over again before he (she) is able to grasp
what is being said.
not at all hardly somewhat quite extremely
4. This youth seems to be limited in his (her) ability to
see alternative ways of dealing with various situations.
not at all hardly somev/hat quite extremely
APPENDIX D
aatlng Scales of Youths' Internalized Guilt
1^1
EATING SCALES 0? YOUTHS' INTEHMALIZED GUILT
1. When this youth oo^lts a wrong act. he (she) feels
genuinely miserable Inside.
^^^^ ^^tF^
2. If this youth were certain he (she) would not get
caught, he (she) would not hesitate to steal some
money that was lying on a nearby table.
not at all hardly i^Si^b iitFiSil^
3. This youth refrains from wrong doings only because he
(she) is afraid of being punished.
not at all hardly somewhat ^iUti extremely
^. The actions of this youth seem to be guided by his (her)
own standards and values.
not at all hardly somewhat ^[Hti extremely
APPEI^IDIX E
Rating Scale of Attitude of Worker Toward Youth
1^3
RATING SCilL3 OF ATTITUDE OF WOHKER TOWARD lOOTH
compared with other youths I have worked with. I feel a
ereat deal of attachment and affection for this particular
youth.
not at all hardly iBSiSSt qSiti "extremely
APPENDIX F
Initial Instructions to Subject Groups
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INITIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECT GROUPS
"This IS a study to try to find out what opinions and
beliefs young people In Institutions have about certain
things. Your answers will be held confidential and no
one here at the school (Receiving Center) will see your
individual responses or papers. Please be as honest and
as serious as you possibly can. You will be paid ,„2.00
for participation in this study, which will take place in
two parts. The second part will be a week from today and
Mill take only about ten minutes of your time."
AFPi':NDIX G
Hotter Locus of Control (I-S) Scale
1^7
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ROTTEH LOCUS OP CONTaOL (I-E) SCALE
DATE:
GROUP:
case it kTll vnf '^'^'"'^ ^^^^ ^-li-^- to be theas far as you're concerned. Be sure to~7el6Gt th^ nnoyou actually believe to be more true rather thai the one youthink you should choose or the one you would like to be trueThis is a measure of personal belief: obviously there areno right or wrong answers. ^
In some instances you may discover that you believe bothstatements or neither one. In such cases, be sure to selectthe one you more strongly believe to be case as far as you'reconcerned. Also try to respond to each item independently
choice?
choice; do not be influenced by your previous
1. a. Children get into trouble because their parents punishthem too much.
b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that theirparents are too easy with them.
2. a. Many of the imhappy things in people's lives are
partly due to bad luck,
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they
make.
3. a. One of the major reasons why xire have wars is because
people don't take enough interest in politics,
b. There will always be wars, not matter how hard people
try to prevent them.
4. a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve
in the world.
b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes
unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.
5. a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is
nonsense.
b. Most students don't realize the extent to which their
grades are influenced by accidental happenings.
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without the right breaks one cannot be an effective
S^2aS^e"S? th^eL*°p^-?- i-r- not
ll^Tytn. """^ P-°P1- i-st aon.t
People who can't eret othprc? t-o t ^ 4.,
stand how to .^et along with o?hers!
pe'rsonaL?'?-"^ determining one's
they'a^e'lik:!^'^'^^^^^ '^'^ ^^^^^^ determine what
happln."'''" '"^^ ^-i-S to happen will
Trusting to fate has never turned out as wpIias^making a decision to take a difini'trc^Sse'of
rST^!^'.!
wellprepared student there is
tiil/''^'' "^^^ f ^'^^^S as an unfair test,hany mes exam questions tend to be so unrelatedto course work that studying is really u^^ess!
har?i^??i! ^ ^^^^^^ h^^^ ^^ork; lucks little to do with it.
Getting a good job depends mainly on being in theright place at the right time.
The average citizen can have an influence in govern-ment decisions. b'jver
This world is run by the few people in power, andthere is not much the little suy can do about it.
l/hen I make plans, I am almost certain that I can
make them work.
It Is not always wise to plan too far ahead because
many things turn out to be a matter of good or badfortune anyhow.
There are certain people who are just no good.
There is some good in everybody.
In my case getting what I want has little or nothinc;
to do with luck.
Many times we might just as well decide what to do
by flipping a coin.
Who gets to be the boss often defends on who was
lucky enough to be in the right place first.
Getting people to do the right thing depends UDon
ability; luck has little or nothing to do with' it.
150
18.
nor control
forces we can neither understand
b. ihere really is no such thing as "luck!"
"
19. a. One should always be willing to admit mistakesb. It is usually best to cover" up one • s mistakes!
^'
Ukes vo^! ^^"'^"^ ^ really
P^rsoHoh^e'' '""^ '^^^"'^ a
^^^"Ss that happen to usare balanced by the good ones.
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of abilityIgnorance, laziness, or all three.
o i r/,
^*
tlS.^''^"^^
^^^^""^
^^'^ ^^^^ ^^l^^^^^l
^*
ii^ ^^u?^^^^''''?-^
^"^'^ ^^^e much control overthe things politicians do In office.
23. a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive
at the grades they give,
b. There Is a direct connection between how hard I
study and the grades I get.
24. a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves
what they should do.
b. A good leader makes It clear to everybody what theirjobs are.
25. a. Many times I feel that I have little Influence overthe things that happen to me.
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance orluck plays an important role in my life,
26. a. People are lonely because they don't try to be
friendly.
b. There's not much use in trying too hard to please
people; if they like you, they like you.
27. a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school,
b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character.
28. a. Vihat happens to me is my om doing.
b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control
over the direction my life is taking.
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l2lt\ll\TtZyTo? politicians
In the long run the people are rp^-nnncivn ^ ,
government on a natlLa?
.sTeX^.Tonl'loHl I'fvel,
APPENDIX H
Mosher Guilt Scale
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KOSHER GUILT SCALH
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Name
~ —
— Age
c-h^-h ^
questionnaire consists of a number of pairs ofstatements or opinions which have been given hv coIiLp m^nin response to the "Kosher Incomplete Sentences ^est " ?h2semen were asked to complete phrases such as .^mLTtkl T'^'
if * • ^^^^ ^'^^^ • • to make a sentencf-which expressed their real feelings about the stem ?hisquestionnaire consists of the stems to which they res^Sndedand a pair of their responses which are letter^^ A I^H?
A a/^^T^? ^^^"^ ^^^^ the pair of completions and
is^ic'of von ''^'K^r^^
^ith or which is most characteS?t y u. Your choice, in each instance, should be in
lllTt f^^y?^ believe, how you feel, or how you wouldreac , and not in terms of how you think you should believefeel, or respond. This is not a test. There are no tllhtor wrong answers. Your choices should be a descriDtion'ofyour own personal beliefs, feelings, or reactions.'
4.T_
Instances you may discover that you believeboth completions or neither completion to be characteristic
of you. In such cases select the one you more stronglybelieve to be the case as far as you are concerned. ~Se sure
lu ^^^.^
answer for every choice. Do not omit an item eventhough it is very difficult for you to decide. Just selectthe more characteristic member of the pair. Encircle theletter. A or B. whichever you most agree with.
When I tell a lie
. .
A. it hurts.
3. I make it a good one.
To kill in war ...
A. is a job to be done.
B. is a shame but sometimes a necessity.
iJomen who curse
, ,
A. are normal.
B. make me sick.
I punish myself
. .
.
A. for the evil I do.
B. very seldom for other people do it for me.
Obscene literature
. . .
A. is sinful and a corrupt business.
B. is fascinating reading.
I detest myself for
. .
.
A. my sins and failures.
B. for not having more exciting sexual experiences
I punish myself ...
A. never.
B. by feeling nervous and depressed.
When I tell a lie
. . .
A. I'm angry with myself.
E. I mix it with truth and serve it like a Kartini
One should not
. . .
A. knowingly sin.
B. try to follow absolutes.
I detest myself for
. . .
A. nothing, I love life.
B. not being more nearly perfect.
Obscene literature
. . .
A. should be freely published.
B. helps people become sexual perverts.
I regret
. . .
A. my sexual experiences.
B, nothing I've ever done.
A guilty conscience
. . .
A. does not bother me too much.
B. is worse than a sickness to me.
1^. I regret
, .
.
B* f??^^5'^
caught, but nothing else,a. all of my sins.
15. Uhen I tell a lie
.
. .
A. ray conscience bothers me
B. I wonder whether I'll gei away with it.
16. v;hen caught in the act
A. I try to bluff my way'out.
3. truth is the best policy.
17. 1/hen I tell a lie
b! l\ell'a ^^^^P^^^^'^^ ^^^her an odd occurrence.
19. Sin and failure.
.
.
A. are two situations we try to avoidB. do not despress me for long.
20. If I robbed a bank
. .
A. I would live like a'king.
B. I should get caught.
21. Sin and failure
. .
.
A. are the works of the Devil.
B. have not bothered me yet.
22. I tried to make amends
. . ,
A. for all my misdeeds, but I can't forget them.
B. but not if I could help it.
23. I detest myself for
. . .
A. nothing, and only rarely dislike myself.
B, thoughts 1 sometimes have.
2k, Arguments leave me feeling
. . .
A. satisfied usually.
B. exhausted.
25. When someone swears at me
. .
.
A, I swear back.
3. it usually bothers me even if I don't show it.
APPENDIX I
Hunt Paragraph Completion Measure and Instruct!
(Cognitive Complexity)
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PARAGRAPH COKPLKTION MEASURS AND INS'
(COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY)
Name
_
~~
— ^-ale Female
Grade in school
sentences on each topic. ^^^^^ ^^^ee
n.m J^^""^ ""J^ ""^^^^ °^ ^'^^^^^^ answers, so ;rive yourown ideas and opinions about each toDic Indfllt/^^lyou reanz feel about each topic, not ?he way others felTor the way you think you should feel. wn el
You will have about 3 minutes for each page.
Please wait for the signal to go to a new page.
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1. V/hat I think about rules
Try to write at least three sentences on this topic.
WAIT FOR SIGNilL. TO TURN PAGE
159
2. When I am criticized
.
Try to write at least three sentences on this topic.
miT FOR SIGNAL TO TURII PAGE
l6o
3. What I think about parents
.
Try to write at least three sentences on this topic.
WAIT FOR SIGNAL TO TUiWi PAGE
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^. l/hen someone disagrees with me
Try to write at least three sentences on this topic.
WAIT FOR SIGNAL TO TUIilT PAGE
162
5. V/hen I arc not sure
. . ,
Try to write at least three sentences on this topic
WAIT FOR SIGNAL TO TUBN PAGE
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6, When I am told what to do
.
Try to write at least three sentences on this topic.
AFPEI\!DIX J
Feather Choice-of-Prizes Test and Instructl
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FaiTEEH CH0ICE-0F-PE1,SS TEST Aim ISSTHUCTIOHS
At the end of the first session each subject was
individually called Into an office and given a card of
the followin;? description:
^^--^^i^-^^ SECOND CHQTn g
First Week: :i 7^ ^ ..
' <^ First l/eek:
Second i/eek:
.jl 2^ — o
>^
.
-L'^p Second Week:
Total 32.00
} .25
^2.00
Total ;^i2.25
Instructions
:
"You probably remember being told that you will be
paid for helping out with this study. That is true but I
am going to pay you in two parts rather than all at once.
I want you to look at this card and decide how you want to
be paid. You will notice that you have two choices. The
first choice is to take ;:i.75 right now and get a. 25 next
week, when I see you again, for a total of ;i;2.00. The
second choice is to take $.25 right now and :52.00 next week,
for a total of :^2.25. ivhich choice do you want?"
AFFEITDIX K
Instructions for the Porteus Mazes Test
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INSTHUCTIONS POP. THE POHTEUS MAZES TSST
"This is what is called a maze and you must draw with
your pencil like this." (S^a^iner takes the pencil a^d
draws about I.5 inches of the course from the starting
arrow near the rat to around the first turn.) "These
lines are all supposed to be walls and this rat went in
here (Indicating arrow) to try and get some cheese."
(Point to cheese at end of maze.) "Now I want you to draw
a line showing me where the rat x^ent to find the cheese.
But you must be very careful not to cross any lines or to
go into any place that is blocked at the other end. If
you go into any blocked place, you cannot turn around and
come out. You must start all over again with a new maze.
One more thing you must remember—this is not a speed
test and you caji stop anywhere and look as long as you like
while you decide which way to go, but try not to lift your
pencil off the paper until you are right outside the maze.
Start as soon as you are ready."
Testing is continued until all the designs of a series
have been successfully worked through within the allox-jable
number of trials. At any point v/here a subject draws
through an imaginary line across the entrance to a blind
street or alley, the design is removed and an "unsuccessful
trial," not a failure, is recorded. Failure is recorded
only if this takes place after the nmnber of trials allowed
in the rules has occurred— two in each test design up to and
including Year XI, four in the XII, XIV, and Adult mazes.
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Testing and scoring normally cease after three failures
Where In the series have been recorded, or two successive
failures in Year XI or above.
any-
APPENDIX L
Summary of Original and Partial Correlation Coefficients
of I-Level with Dependent Variables with
Age, Sex, and Ethnic Background Removed
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SUMARY OF ORIGINAL AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
OF I-LSVSL WITH DEPET^DENT VARIABLES WITH
AGE, SEX. Al^D ETHNIC BACKGROUND REMOVED
Dependent Variable.^ Orljri>i«i (^ ^^^^^^^^ ip:inal (Age, Sex, Race)
.58 .ii,5
.^1
1. Verbal I. Q. (WISC)
2. Performance I. Q, (WISC)
.53
3. Locus of Control (Rotter)
-.15
_ 22
^. Internalized Guilt O'^ no
(Kosher) -02
5. CoRTiltive Complexity
.50 ur.(Hunt)
6. Foresight (Forteus T. Q.) .32 23
7. Impulse Control . -37
(Forteus Q) '^^ "-^^
8. Delay of Gratification I', ^n(Feather)
9. Rated Locus of Control
-.4-0
-.33
10. Rated Cognitive 1^2
Complexity * '
11. Rated Internalized Guilt
.28 ,20
APPENDIX M
Jane Loevinger on Factor Analysis and Personality research
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JAME tOEVINGEH ON FACTOR ANALYSIS AND PERSONALITY HESEAHCH
It is important to note that precisely th^
virL'S?"'"" f ^^-^ between Sar
^^^u^^'''^
milestone sequences, is oneto which factor analysis is blind if webegin by taking as our quantitative variablesseparate aspects of several stares of the ego
lation hfr"'' ''^^^ computational mlS^u.however high speed a machine will sortthem out to reconstruct the conceot of ego levelpresented here. A considerable number of peoplehave arrived at some version of this conceDt
c~e?r^*'^"'j. People Without'omputers have discovered this conceDt, butnot those using computers.) if we are operatingin such studies with a series of quantitative ®
measures of ego milestones, one wSuld exDect amelange of low and curvilinear relationsl-preclsely what is usually observed.
i'/ith respect to ego level, it 'seems to bethe case that those manifestations observable
at a minimal inferential level are just the
milestones, while the polar aspects, DroDerlytreated as quajititative
, are only inferabledirectly from patterns of observed behaviorThus the ultra-behavlorist is doomed to deal intrivialities in the personality field, for he
approaches the area with a predilection at oncefor observing behavior at a minimal inferentiallevel and for quantitative variables. But thisis a contradiction; what can be observed mostdirectly are the milestones rather than the
quantitative aspects. This is the behaviorlst
'
s
dilemma, and a possible explanation for much
of the frustration and confusion that have
beset personality measurement (I966, p. 20^).
APPENDIX K
Description of the Seven Levels of I-Level Theory
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DESCRIPTION OF THE SEVEN LEVELS OF I-LEVLX THEORY
At this level the discrimination of differences betwe
self and non-self occurs. As an infant, there is little
awareness of differences between self and the world, but
the child gradually becomes aware as he or she cannot
reduce tension without interactions with things or people
outside him or herself. This differentiation is a gross
one with people and objects seen as relievers of tension.
An adult operatin.'^ at this level would appear to act as if
he or she were the whole world. Basically this would be
a rather schizoid adjustment in the sense that it takes
gross distortions of reality to maintain this concept of
self. The level 1 individual is non-comprehending of
environmental influences and his or her role in them.
^evel_2
:
The Integration of Monself Difference s
The differentiation of the environment into persons
and objects occurs at this level, with some appreciation
of the characteristics of each. Kavinn; become aware of
the distinction of self and nonself
, the developing
personality becomes concerned with the problem of how to
handle the rest of the world. At this primitive level
of differentiation, response value Is still closely linked
in the child's mind with the stimulus value of objects.
Through a procedure of trial and error, she finds those
who meet her particular needs, and people are seen in terms
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of Whether they are "givers" or "deniers." An adult operating
at Level 2 faces life with apparent trust, expecting the
world to be composed of givers and functioning fairly well
as long as this is true. In his or her need to master objects
and people, he or she frequently falls into crude, transparent
attempts at manipulation. The typical response to denial
or even slight pressure is "flight or fight." The Level 2
person has poor capacity to explain, understand, or predict
the behavior or reactions of others. Ke or she is not
interested in things outside himself except as a source of
supply. He or she behaves impulsively, unaware of anything
except the grossest effects of his behavior on others
(v;arren. I967)
.
Level 3 : Ihe^tegrajlon of aules
Level 3 Includes the perception of rules or formulae
governing the relationships betx>reen people and objects with
a beginning aviareness of potential for complex manipulation.
Now the child begins to find relationships more complex.
This discovery Is initiated by contact with the formulae or
expectancies governing the relationships between people
and objects. Not only must he or she be in contact with
someone in order to meet satisfactions, but that necessary
person must also be able to have the power to do this. The
child Is taught both explicitly and Implicitly that definite
rules govern the relationships between people and objects,
and that these rules seem to control "big" people. An
adult operating at this level is ruled by the premise that
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the world is a series of rigidly organized, rule-bound
relationships, and is concerned with what he or she must
do so that he or she can make people respond positively.
More than the 1-2. the 1-3 person does understand that his
or her o.m behavior has something to do with whether or not
he or She gets what he or she wants. This person does not
operate from an internalized value system but rather seeks
external structure in terms of rules and formulas for
operation. His or her understanding of formulas is
indiscriminate and oversimplified. The 1-3 person perceives
the world and his or her part in it on a power dimension.
Although he can learn to play a few stereotyped roles, he
cannot understand many of the needs, feelings, and motives
of another person who is different from himself. He is
unmotivated to achieve in a long-range sense, or to plan
for the future (..-arren, I967). Many of these features
contribute to his inability to accurately predict the
response of others to him.
li^Ut' The Inte.'^ration of Conflict and 7?^.<.nnn.c;o
At this level the perception of the influence and
psychological force of others occurs. The child is now
prepared to see himself in new, more objective terms. His
behavior is primarily influenced by his own needs, but he
is also aware of the influence of others and of their
expectations of him. At this point, social anxiety begins
to emerge as a motivating force. He may assume the
attitudes characterizing another person or may use the
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gestures another uses, and others respond to these gestures
and attitudes. Hole-playlng is a safe kind of practicing.
leading to a greater differentiation and social Interaction.
Having globally accepted what others feel as being right and
™ong. the Child is caught In the conflict of wanting to be
like significant others, and wanting to give expression
to his ovm needs. Further ber-^^nc^o r>-p o. xu.i , oecause of his oxm participation
in the roles, some internalization has taken place, and
when he fails to live up to these new standards, he feels
guilty and self
-critical
.
The adult i^o functions at this
level is often plagued by anxiety and guilt regarding his
global concepts of' good and bad. He frequently finds
himself in conflict situations because he is caught between
two incompatible ideals or goals, both of which seem equally
important. lie is said to closely resemble the "authoritarian-
personality; he is rather tense, suspicious, beirtldered.
sometimes hostile, and always anxious—a person caught in
a struggle x^ith new and socially determined feelings of guilt.
^evel 5 : The Integration of Continuity
At this level is found the perception of stable action
patterns in self and others. As the person begins to solve
some of the conflicts inherent in the very roles he has taken
over, he begins to perceive patterns of relationships and
significant symbols identifying these relationships, and
learns about distinctions obtaining in his own society. He
becomes aware of continuity in his ovm life and in the lives
of others, sensing a relationship in this continuity betx^een
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response In the past and response in the present a^d future.
For the first time there is a noticeable appreciation for
others as unit personalities and an understanding of what
they do and feel. He begins to perceive others as complex,
flexible people who ca.nnot be dealt xvith on the basis of
a few simple rule-of
-thumb procedures, /m adult operating
at this level is free from some of the problems of an overly
tense identification, and can deal with others without being
submerged in them. He can enjoy people, be stimulated by
them, and respond to them as individuals. He is not overly
concerned by the fact that people change. He may be bothered
by the incompatibility of the roles he plays, he may feel
diffuse, wondering which of his roles is basic—which is the
"real m.e."
Level 6
:
The Interaction of Self-Conslstencj;
At this level the perception of differences between
oneself and the social roles which one may play momentarily
is found. The Level 6 person perceives that he need not
become the role, but rather he may carry the role as a node
of response. Roles are defined at this stage in terms of
relationships and interactions with others. The self is
viewed as distinct and separate from any specific relation-
ship with others. It Involves intra-action. An adult at
this level is relatively stable himself, and sees others
as enduring, stable persons, since he Imows the individual
is more than his various roles and shifting behavior. A
person f unctioning at this level may have situationally Induced
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anxiety concerning the welfare of himself and others, but the
adjustive capacity inherent in this integration would almost
preclude delinquent or criminal behavior.
LevelJ: ^iie_Int^2rat^nj)f^
Here perception of integrating processes in self a^id
others occurs. At Level 7 the person is not only aware of
self and roles, but begins to comprehend focusing on integrat-
ing processes in himself and others. He sees a variety of
ways of perceiving and integrating, some of which lead to
more adequate expectations and hypotheses than others. This
development greatly enhances his capacity for understanding
and dealing with people who may be functioning at integration
levels other than his oim. Probably no one completes this
stage in today's society.
(Adapted from Sullivan, Grant and Grant, 1957.)
APPENDIX 0
Table of Raw Scores
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TABLE OF HAN SCORES
In the table on the follo.^ng pages, the numbered
variables represent the following:
1. Verbal I.Q. (WISC)
2. Performance I.Q. (WISC)
3. Locus of Control (Hotter I-e Scale)
^. Internalized Guilt (Kosher Guilt Scale)
5. Cop:nltlve Complexity (Hunt CC I-'easure)
6. Poreslght (Porteus TQ)
7. Impulse Control (Porteus Q)
^*
Testf
°^ Gratification (Feather's Cholce-of-Prlzes
9. Rated Locus of Control (Behavioral I-E Rating)
10. Rated Internalized Guilt (Behavioral IG Rating )
11. Rated Cognitive Complexity (Behavioral CC Rating)
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